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

What Is To Be Done?

An Agenda for the Second Administration by Bell, Reynolds, Schneider, Taggert

Tyrrell on Coolidge: Anticipating the Future

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the ALTERNATIVE

to bare the witness and the truth

DEPARTMENTS

The Continuing Crisis 2
Editorial: R. Emmett Tyrrell, Jr. 3
The Great American Column: Roger Rosenblatt 4
Contributors 8
The Public Discourse: Paul H. Weaver 14
Letter From a Whig: C. Bascom Slemp 17
Correspondence: 18
The Bootblack Stand: Letters to Plunkitt from Senator Gravel and Opel Johnny Morton 24
Current Wisdom: by Assorted Jackasses 26

ARTICLES

Joseph Morris: Lessons of an Election Year 5
Haven Bradford Gow: In Defense of Freedom 6
Eric Brodin: Hope for Sweden? 16

SYMPOSIUM: WHAT IS TO BE DONE?

Jeffrey Bell: Nixon and Realignment 7
Alan Reynolds: Deficits, Controls, and Unflation 9
William Schneider, Jr.: A National Security Agenda for the Second Nixon Administration 11
Tom Taggert: Tory Socialists and the Second American Revolution 12

REVIEWS

W. Wesley MacDonald on *Eliot and His Age* 19
Ronald F. Docksai on *The Impudent Snobs:* 21
Peter Hughes on *Things To Come* 22
David Brudnoy: Man vs. Nature; Man vs. Maleness 23

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The Continuing Crisis

● On October 16, as Messrs. Nixon and McGovern expended the last of their spitballs and persiflage, an associate professor of Government at Harvard, Doris Kearns, unbosomed herself regarding "Play and Power: Some Thoughts on Children and Politics in America" to an audience of professors, students, and nonplussed maintenance men.

● Meanwhile fabulous tales of Republican espionage, hanky-pank, and boodle flushed the front pages of the Washington *Post* and various other anti-administration gazettes. Though the White House sniffs at all of these allegations, the news reports have been implicating more and more powerful White House aides. Even the name of the Assistant President, Mr. H.R. Haldeman, has not been spared, and Mr. McGovern has taken note.

● Accepting all allegations as convictions, the ex-professor of history has given up comparing Mr. Nixon with Adolph Hitler, the late German politico, and now describes the President as a modern Boss Tweed. Nevertheless as the campaign folds into history it seems that, given a choice between Hitler and McGovern, or even Tweed and McGovern, McGovern loses — at least according to October's polls. And the Nixon campaign has worked steadily to influence those polls with a smooth media campaign and an awesome array of national citizens committees, some of the more potent of which are: Volunteer Firemen for Nixon, Funeral Directors for Nixon, and — with an eye to the new politics — Indians for Nixon, Aleuts for Nixon, Eskimos for Nixon, and Hairdressers for Nixon. Not surprisingly Mr. Nixon expects to win big, and despite all the malodorous rumors the campaign is not all calumny and vitriol. On October 13 Sargent Shriver, the patrician aesthete, found poetry in Mr. Nixon and complimented him for being the "greatest con artist in political history."

● The incomparable 92nd Congress shut down its wind tunnel on October 18 after casting an unsurpassed 532 recorded votes during more than 175 hours of roll calls. It rejected about 66 percent of Mr. Nixon's proposals, allowing bills for Welfare reform, consumer protection, and mass transit to expire in the last hours. Another of the windy 92nd's historic achievements was revealed by the *Chicago Tribune* which discovered that eleven members of that distinguished body managed absentee rates of over 40 percent! Hoosiers breathed a sigh of relief when it was found that the senator caught breeding chickens in his Capitol office was not Senator Vance Hartke but rather Maryland's Senator Charles Mathias.

(continued on page 24)

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Editorial:

A President for all the People

In the second volume of his Memoirs, *President Truman lamented that the president "seldom has time to reflect," and he went on to say that "one of the hardest things for the President to do is to find time to take stock." Now during most of the presidencies of this century this inability has probably been an appreciable benefit to the Republic. Yet at times the weight and pother of the presidential schedule probably has damaged attempts at a coherent set of policies or even at making a judicious choice of policies.*

It is with this in mind that we asked Jeffrey Bell, Alan Reynolds, Tom Taggert and William Schneider to put together four essays suggesting a sensible agenda for the Nixon Administration's next four years. We expect no invitations from the White House, but we hope the essays will prove educational, for they all rise up from what we hold to be an intelligent and prescient set of principles.

So these are the kinds of policies that we think a president should follow, but what of the president himself? How should he deport himself? In the following essay our editor discusses what he believes to be the proper role and conduct of a modern American president. The essay was originally delivered at this year's July 4th Saturday Evening Club commemorating the one hundredth anniversary of the birth of President Coolidge. Curiously, the speech was the only one of its kind delivered through the entire centennial year. But it was not uncelebrated, for the New York Times *snatched it up immediately and published a revision of it. Since then scholars have shown a new and lively interest in the great man, and the libraries are hard pressed with orders for his complete works. Obviously, the last decades of this century will see the Great Cal exhumed and his reputation dusted off. He might soon be one of the most relevant names in American political theory. By 2072 the following essay will be read wherever ardent democrats survive.*

It became my custom several years ago, upon assuming stewardship of this renowned intellectual digest, to take leave of the serene hills of southern Indiana and to journey east, there to dip into the *haute* culture of the original Americans — the various health exhibits around New York's Times Square, Boston's famed salons, and, of course, the intellectual haunts down in Washington. During these holidays the cognoscenti besiege me with many lively and percipient questions, always startling me with their keen sense for history's currents, their political savvy and their incomparable grasp of the America that sprawls beyond the Appalachian barrier. So it is that as 1972's shouting match begins to heat up I expect to be asked variants of the question recently asked me by a New York editor when he said, "As a Hoosier, what do you and the rest of the people in California desire in the next President?" Obviously, the question is a serious one, and it demands a serious response.

I suppose Hoosiers are just like all other Americans. They ask that their president be a distinctive sort of man, touched by greatness — a statesman of vision, a fount of prudence and benevolence. Like all Americans we are vulnerable to the gifted sloganeers who herald "a breath of fresh air," from candidates who can "get the nation going again." But we who are afflicted with these political slogans interpret things differently from those clever fellows who dream them up.

In plain English, ungarnished by campaign poesy, we believe that what America needs is a president who spends less time bumping and grinding before the bulging eyes of the media and more time ministering to the needs of the people, that is to say, a president who spends more time at the siesta and in the Rose Garden. What captivated us about Ike was his energetic pursuit of golf balls. During Harry Truman's presidency our confidence was always bolstered when he would set up shop down in Key West. He was a sound leader and would have been kissed by greatness had he only spent more time wandering around the Gulf, disturbing marlins. Presidents Kennedy and Johnson were well-intentioned men, but the truth is they spent just too much time pulling levers and shifting gears.

In fact America has not had a great President since Calvin Coolidge. Mr. Coolidge probably spent more time napping than any other president in the nation's history, surpassing even the sainted Roosevelt, a man whose tenure in office exceeded his by eight years. Mr. Coolidge took a nap every day of his life and during heavy weather he often took two. His most ambitious public act was to take long languorous voyages down the Potomac on the presidential yacht *Mayflower*, and when the talk among his official guests turned fervent he would fade away to contemplate the doings of his sheep. In fact, those in the know around Washington whispered that the chief suffered from narcolepsy, but none was heard to complain. The government claimed to do less good in those days and hence did less harm.

In the summer of 1927 when all the greasy-pawed politicians were slinking about, oiling up the campaign bandwagon for Mr. Coolidge's 1928 re-election, he left Washington to establish a summer White House, but not amid the gorgeous confusion of California or Florida. Calvin brought the splendor of the presidency to Rapid City, South Dakota, and disturbed the national calm only twice, once when his wife kept him waiting one and one-quarter hours for lunch, and again when he preemptorily flattened the Republican sachems with that mysterious statement, "I do not choose to run for president in 1928." It was the end of an era. Calvin slipped out of Washington as inconspicuously as he had slipped in, and no sooner had he rolled down the sheets in his Northampton, Massachusetts home than disaster and tumult befell the land. Hoover saturninely fussed about for a while, but his show had no sauce. Then Roosevelt glided onto the stage and began to whoop it up. Alas, the nation has never been the same.

Today a man is not considered fit for high public office unless he can spin yarns of Utopia and Apocalypse, squall about the more glamorous species of injustice and dazzle the visual lusts of a mad industry of electronic con men. Ours is a time of glamorously marketed crisis and doom, and I cannot think of a catastrophe that does not bring with it a swarm of Florence Nightingales armed with magic wands and bearing Good News. Yet, there are only a handful of these catastrophes that would not fade into the most remote pages of the daily newspaper were it not for the bellowings of their attendant charlatans. So much for what the Founders called republican moderation; there is another deranged axiom guiding contemporary American politics that recommends a return to the Coolidge Cool.

According to American folklore the ideal president is an authentic man of the people, undistinguished by wealth or achievement, unbeholden to any interest group or potentates. Only such a president could have the real interests of the people at heart. He would dutifully mind the shop, scrupulously husbanding the nation's resources while treading the path of natural goodness that is characteristic of his wholesome ancestry. Such a man would be a blessing to the Republic and a bromide to this troubled globe.

What makes this tale a hollow joke is that our present president comes from just such an unexceptional nest. The President could be no more common were he purchased in a Sears, Roebuck and Company catalogue; nonetheless the curators of American folklore find him repulsive. Lamenting his "inability to inspire," they have been shattered by his shallowness and gaucherie. In America our presidential candidates are to embody the virtues of a second-rater and our presidents the grandeur of Napoleon.

The merest glance at the political scene convinces me that the political science of the Hoosier is something more useful than the collection of fossilized notions my eastern acquaintances dismiss it as. Were Hoosierpolitik to energize future administrations I have no doubt America would be as free of mischief, crisis, and paradox as the Vatican. No president can possibly fulfill the contradictory demands made on him and it is foolish to try. As the federal government expands, bringing with it a bewildering population of bureaucrats, it is obvious that no president really controls his government, and after listening to the cads and charlatans making a run for it in 1972, this appears to be one of the

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few things the citizens have to be grateful for. Supposedly one of the grave scandals of the age is that the Pentagon is ravenously and surreptitiously looting the Treasury, leaving the President and the Senate without any idea of what the big brass is up to. But at Health, Education and Welfare, no president has *ever* known what was going on, and if he did he could be tried for treason. Waste, malfeasance, and idiocy are the little costs everyone must pay for the blessing of big government. There are people swatting flies over at the State Department who are still waiting for Woodrow Wilson to return from Europe, and the situation at the Post Office is an American legend. It is the price America must pay to fulfill its historic promise.

I stand with the illustrious Senator from Maine. The question in 1972 is faith in government, and the first thing the President can do to restore faith in our system is to wear proudly the soup stains on his shirt and admit that he has no idea what is going on in the vast nether regions of his administration. Further, he might add that neither a middle Americano, nor a welfare fellow, nor a black, a woman, a student, nor a gay is ever going to inspire much devotion as president. Besides, inspirational leaders generally wear epaulets and are rarely friends of democracy.

The essential job for every American president is: (a) to entertain the citizenry at a minimum cost to the polity, and (b) to reassure his fellow citizens that in America practically anyone innocent of felonious acts can be president. There is nothing wrong with the President's attending sports extravaganzas, indeed he should attend more of them. And when he is not losing himself in the drama of competitive sport, he should give himself over to loafing on the front porch of the White House or to taking his wife out to the shopping center — especially if she is ugly. The President should embody the virtues of the common man and nothing more. Keep the fabulists and the sloganeers on Madison Avenue out of politics. Teach the good government crowd a lesson, and emulate the great Coolidge. Open the windows, let the sun shine in...and get plenty of sleep.

R. Emmett Tyrrell, Jr.

Roger Rosenblatt

The Great American Column

The People's Choice

By now we take it as a national truism, that nobody ever knows anything about politics. We hear disclaimers voiced loud and clear by our various candidates; we watch millionaire party doners shy away from television cameras like Munchkins; we listen to campaign managers swear they're only country boys themselves; and observe everybody else who makes a living out of politics protest passionately that he is merely an amateur, a dilettante, a humble man. I suppose this happens because on one level politics is still considered to be a Renaissance activity, beneath the professional devotion of one's whole mind. On a more practical level, no candidate ever wants to appear to be seeking public approval professionally, because that would deny him the divinity he seeks once he gets it. All the same, it's a remarkable delusion: politicians, the governors of much of our lives, continually averring that they know nothing of their craft, winding up at the seats of power purely by accident of their own perfection.

The source of their need to prove amateurism is, as usual, ourselves. It is we who have decided at a very early stage in our history that politics is a dirty business, indeed anti-democratic in the American Romantic sense, and that no self-respecting individual, certainly no individual coveting our respect, should be soiled by it. Therefore, no one is. We discover, particularly in the years of presidential elections, that there are no politicians in the country whatsoever. Only just plain folks and statesmen, drafted by popular craving, translated by dint of their willingness to serve to a loftier sphere. It is there that we have put them, and there we have them, high, ripe, and vulnerable.

Our candidates, on the other hand, believe that it is we who are deluded, or that we are willing to be deluded, which amounts to the same thing. They do whatever candidates have to do in their real or apocryphal back rooms, and then unveil themselves like Bette Davis in *Mrs. Minnever*, scrubbed, polished, wigs in place, and eager for that old approbation. We deny it to the less appealing contender, and send him slouching towards reappraisal. We award it to the nominee, and launch him upwards, equipped with the knowledge that if he wants to win the whole election, all he has to do is stay out of politics. He chuckles to himself. We chuckle at him.

For while he has what he wants in his nomination, we also have him where we seem to want him—a disembodied public smile floating, like a great Thanksgiving Day balloon, into the blue distance. Prevented by cultural convention from appearing before us as he is, a fallible human being seeking mass affection, admiration, authority, and work, he must instead become a symbol, specifically a Virtue. He is an amateur, after all, not to be judged by low things like competence and experience. What he must satisfy is "image," the one we have given him. We have said we like his "guts," or his "Heart," or his "savvy," or "vigor." We have shaped his candidacy by saying so, and likewise would shape his presidency.

As for the candidates in this melodrama, Mr. Vigor and Mr. Heart, they inevitably become more ridiculous as their campaigns progress. Fixed to their images or Humors as if fixed to stars, aided and coached in their roles by newsmen and ad men and party pros, they begin to develop absurd consistencies. If Mr. Vigor wins the election, then once in office it is Vigor, the quality, which wins and which must persist. If Mr. Heart loses, then he must take on the character of Mr. Broken (and Brave) Heart, just as Mr. Vigor, had he lost, would have had to become Mr. Courage or Unity First. We, meanwhile, sit back and watch the nonsense multiply. Sleepy-eyed and minded before the tube, we see these figures of our creation try to get through to us. Us, whom they do not know. Us, who blew them out of reach in the first place.

In the past twenty years, we, out of our lazy and convenient imaginations, have set up and witnessed the following allegorical battles: Stevenson the Witty vs. Ike the Strong; Stevenson the Critical vs. Eisenhower the Dignified; Kennedy the Dynamic vs. Nixon the Crafty; Johnson the Professional vs. Goldwater the Patriotic; Humphrey the Folksy vs. Nixon the Resilient; Nixon the Strategic vs. McGovern the Moral. We have not pulled the associations out of the air. The candidates themselves have suggested them. What we have done is to exaggerate the designations, to turn these men into caricatures, and the question is why. Because we have a traditional contempt for leadership? Because we would hoist a man's estimation of himself out of proportion in order to watch him fail?

Think of the ways we have conceived of our presidents in the theater and movies. Not a single presidential portrayal stands out in our minds for its sensitivity or complexity. When Raymond Massey or Henry Fonda played Lincoln, they were impressionists on tour, "doing" Lincoln the way Hal Holbrook "does" Mark Twain, with gestures and anecdotes. The same for Ralph Bellamy as Roosevelt in *Sunrise at Campobello*, who assumed the role as if his model had consisted only of teeth and winks. Richard Widmark, Lew Ayres, and Frederick March, our more recent movie presidents, have all played fictional characters, but they too, like their forebears, have merely filled the simple image set before them—look glum, look powerful, look manipulative, look serenely amused. The only theater president who has survived is Wintergreen of *Of Thee I Sing*, and the reason is that Wintergreen is a

(continued on page 25)

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the ALTERNATIVE December 1972

Lessons of an Election Year by Joseph Morris

Let us have a new majority, said Richard Nixon. Let us have decency, said George McGovern. These watchwords dominated the 1972 presidential campaign. It was remarkable that the two candidates should seem to address themselves so directly, and so distinctly, to the central problem of American government: How to sustain a government that is at once of the majority, and decent. Of the many factors which influence the decisions of the American electorate, language is among the most important. But alone it is not decisive. The voters tend somehow to look beyond the watchwords, to sense which of the candidates has the wherewithal to put his theoretical pronouncements into practice. This was the test, then, to which the President and the Senator were subjected.

For Mr. Nixon, the task was to translate his dream of a majority into a working alignment of political interests. Whether he has succeeded is not yet possible to tell (though there is increasing evidence for doubt), for there is more than one kind of majority, and it is altogether possible for minority opinions to control the institutions of government. It may be that the Nixon majority was a presidential, rather than a national one, as the evidence seems to indicate in the first weeks after the election. The events of history seem to focus, at least in our time, on the occupants of the White House. But historians may conclude many years hence that, in fact, Mr. Nixon succeeded only in having himself re-elected by a majority of votes, and that a basic rearrangement of the nation's political forces did not take shape.

Even so, the size of his vote reflected an underlying public confidence in the President's ability to guide the affairs of state. He had come to be respected, albeit grudgingly, by people who, four or twelve years before, could not bring themselves to smile on his name. The Nixon campaign was surprisingly understated, but its effect was to award the President a mantle of dignity unknown to the holders of his office for almost a decade. Successive election-year scandals, which might have toppled regimes in other times, were dismissed resolutely by the public as unrelated to *the President*. Millions of people marched into the voting booths, closed the curtains, and pulled the Nixon lever, mumbling to themselves about how much Richard Nixon had improved over the last four years, and about how the Democratic party had been stolen from them. America judged Richard Nixon on the bases of his values, which were familiar and somehow rooted in the country's traditions, and of his accomplishments, which seemed dramatic, but reassuring. The country had felt impotent, but this unlikely president, Richard Nixon, was generating leadership.

George McGovern had worked tirelessly for more than four years, building a campaign machine of impressive competence and dedication. He battered his way through the year's primary season, earning the reluctant admiration of the Democratic party's professionals at the same time that he incurred their anger. But Senator McGovern essentially was a new figure in the public's eye, and he never managed to shake his early self-identification with one question, the Vietnam war. From the beginning, his base of support was not a broad cross-section of the population, but a strange coalition of those who, in one way or another, were fundamentally disaffected from the political order. Let it not be forgotten that the fall's appeal for decency was but a fresh translation of the spring's call for a New Politics. Moreover, the challenger, unlike the incumbent, had not a record upon which to stand. Who can recall, for example, any legislation — aside from a few end-the-war resolutions, which failed — that bore the name of George McGovern? The Senator was confronted with a dual task: to elaborate a theory of governmental purpose, and to persuade the electorate not only to the theory's rightness, but also of his own ability to apply it.

Now, the Democratic party's platform is a venerable, and a significant, institution. It is ever the pride of the party's grass-roots adherents. More than once in the past had it altered forever the quality, temperament, and vocabulary of American political discourse. But even though George McGovern controlled the platform-making machinery, he erected no philosophical overview of American problems, nor did he set down a concrete program for their solution. Instead, in drafting the platform and in stumping the land, Senator McGovern strung together long lists of existing evils, and offered, as his alternative, "decency." In order to judge this man, who tended to avoid affirmative standpoints except on one issue, and who had no other record, the electorate was forced to judge him by his campaign.

The campaign began in Miami Beach. In the wake of the 1968 Chicago convention, many people urged extensive reform of party rules, and Senator McGovern himself was asked to chair the committee that would, and did, draft the new convention procedures for the Democrats. Expectations rose, therefore, that 1972 would bring a truly "open," verily "democratic," party convention. Reformist zeal proved so strong, however, that great, puissant, and loyal party leaders, among them Mayor Daley and Governor Harriman, were barred from the meeting hall. Many people, and not just the Sixth Ward's sewer workers, found that less than decent. By enraging the professionals before the convention, the Senator *had* to cater to them afterward. He travelled up to Chicago and shook hands with Dick Daley, while the Mayor's boys smiled and winked at each other. Meanwhile, McGovern aides publicly began fighting among themselves to see who would have the biggest office in the White

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House. Amid the prospect of spoils, what had happened to the New Politics?

The Eagleton affair soaked up fully half of the McGovern campaign. With each step he took in those days, Senator McGovern lost some of his "credibility," some of his fair claim to decency. His last attempt at graceful self-extrication from the morass may have been his greatest mistake. He attempted to lift the issue out of the gutter of mere electioneering, and to raise it to the level of institutional criticism. In a statement delivered before the television cameras, the Senator asked rhetorically how anyone receiving his party's presidential nomination one evening after midnight could be expected to make a creditable choice of a running-mate by mid-afternoon of the same day. The problem with that excuse, of course, was that no one believed that his midnight nomination was any surprise to George McGovern. People began to wonder if it were a McGovern habit to defer planning and decision-making until the last minute.

The fatal flaws, in the end, were in the Senator's treatment of the issues. Incumbents often are easy targets, but it is difficult to assail some productivity, however inconstant, without suggesting alternatives. George McGovern spent too much time running against himself, living down his excesses of the happier spring. McGovern supporters admired him for his open-mindedness. The majority thought him a little silly, scurrying about after popular positions. Finally, in the week before the voting, the Senator huffed that, if he were to lose, he could not perform the loser's ritual call for national unity. Such a statement might well be honest, but, coming from George McGovern, it didn't sound decent.

Decency and majority are the necessary elements of good government. Mr. Nixon's orderly pursuit of executive business earned him re-election. Senator McGovern's decency evaporated.

The lesson of Election Year 1972 merits some reflection: a campaign, like a nation, must have an agenda, a set of objectives, and plans for their attainment. Without such provisions, the worth of the enterprise may be lost.

Haven Bradford Gow:

In Defense of Freedom

In civilized discourse it is essential that proper distinctions be made. This, I find, is especially true in discussions regarding freedom lest, in attempting to explain it to others, we end up with merely explaining it away.

Dr. Mortimer Adler tells us in his two-volume work, *The Idea of Freedom*, that there are three basic senses of the term "freedom." First of all, there is the circumstantial freedom of self-realization which equates freedom with the absence of external impediments. It is a freedom that the individual possesses only under certain favorable circumstances.

There is also the natural freedom of self-determination—a freedom which is possessed by all men, by virtue of a power inherent in human nature, whereby man is able to transform his own character creatively by deciding for himself what he will become or do. In this sense man's choices are self-caused and are not determined by processes beyond his control. Circumstances may affect the way men exercise this inherent capacity, and so may moral and mental traits that they do or do not acquire. However, neither acquirements nor circumstances of any sort are able to confer or deprive this freedom.

Lastly, there is the acquired freedom of self-perfection, which identifies freedom with the emancipation from moral sloth and from the slavery of certain mental habits and attitudes. It is a freedom which depends upon an individual's attainment of a certain excellence of mind and character, which, in turn, emanates from his capacity to live as he ought in accordance with the moral law or in an ideal befitting man. For those who believe in this meaning of freedom, a person is not born free, but rather acquires freedom when he has become virtuous.

What I would like to do in this essay is (a) illustrate these senses of freedom by presenting both the views of philosophers and examples from common experience; and (b) focus attention on the second meaning of freedom, since the publication of B. F. Skinner's *Beyond Freedom and Dignity* has revived such an avid interest in the question: Does man have the inherent ability to make free choices and judgments or are they determined by forces outside of his control?

A man is not free, Hobbes held, if he is either externally constrained or coerced. For example, were the state to compel every citizen to bow down before the president whenever he walked by, freedom in Hobbes' sense simply would not exist. And neither would it exist if the state, instead of indulging in coercion, constrained individuals from, say, building churches in which they could worship their God.

Now it is, I think, imperative that a distinction be made here between the freedom of self-realization and what Pitirim A. Sorokin terms "sensate liberty." Freedom in the former sense would still imply a recognition that there are, to be sure, legitimate rules and authorities, and that these rules and authorities are needed to keep us from conflicting with the rights of others. On the other hand, sensate liberty is a decadent form of self-realization, since it suggests that external restraint is both unnecessary and bad in itself. Moreover, it leads, as Sorokin rightly observes, to: "an incessant struggle of men and groups for as large a share of sensate values—wealth...pleasure, comfort, sensory safety, security—as one can get. Since one can get them mainly at the cost of somebody else, their quest accentuates and intensifies the struggle of individuals and groups." (*The Crisis of Our Age*. New York: E. P. Dutton, 1941, p. 174.)

When a person goes to a Chinese restaurant for dinner and decides to eat chow mein instead of fried rice, he is thereby exercising his natural freedom of self-determination. Reflection upon our common experience will yield many such instances in which we exercise our free judgment and free will by choosing between alternatives or goods. (Good in a neutral philosophical sense means any object of desire.) For example, a young mother must choose between having an abortion or giving birth to a retarded child. All the medical evidence indicates that the child born to her will be deformed, and she is tempted to have an abortion in order to save her and her husband from future emotional pain. Nevertheless, the young mother decides to have the child; and by so doing, she has both manifested and exercised the freedom of self-determination.

Now this second meaning is, I believe, of central importance. For if, as some (e.g. Skinner) allege, man is not self-determining, but rather is determined by processes beyond his control, then I am unable to see how one can legitimately maintain that man should be morally accountable for his deeds. (Traditionally in the West, motives behind a person's actions are part of the morality of the actions.) Among those who would negate man's dignity by denying that he has a natural power to make free judgments are the positivists and behaviorists.

The positivist claims that the only valid knowledge is that kind revealed by, and verifiable in terms of, the methods of laboratory science. Since the techniques of the laboratory are unable to reveal that man is free, i.e., self-determining, the positivist holds that man *therefore* is not free, that freedom and dignity are merely figments of our imaginations. The assertions of the positivist are untenable, however, for physical science, because of its own limitations and restrictions, can neither affirm nor negate the freedom of man. And if the fact of man's freedom cannot be ascertained through the methods of the laboratory, it is not because freedom and dignity do not exist, but rather because freedom and dignity exist beyond the laboratory. Besides, as Will Herberg has written, positivism has never been intellectually defensible, since: "it is notorious that positive science itself, its methods and results, depend upon metaphysical postulates and attitudes that cannot, in their nature, be established by way of science, but must be presupposed if the scientific enterprise is to get under way or mean anything at all." ("Modern Man in a Metaphysical Wasteland," *The Intercollegiate Review*, Winter, 1968-69.)

The positivist needs to remember

(continued on page 27)

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What Is To Be Done?

An Agenda for the Second Administration

Jeffrey Bell:

Nixon and Realignment

(WASHINGTON) — In the wake of the November 7 election returns, by far the oddest in American history, political observers here were left with a feeling of numbness. There was little jubilation among Republicans — aside from the narrowly focused group associated with the Committee to Re-Elect the President. There was little despondency among Democrats — excepting the narrowly based group behind the Democratic nominee. For most, the presidential aspect of the election had been over for months. For many, it ended last June, in the final week of the California Democratic Primary, when none other than Hubert Humphrey mounted the most effective anti-Left attack of recent American politics, reversing overnight the upward trend of George McGovern's campaign and starting an irreversible decline in the fortunes of the "Prairie Populist." For other observers, the election ended in Miami, at the "open" convention that turned out to be closed, when McGovern became the first candidate ever to have suffered at the polls as a result of the convention that nominated him. When the Eagleton affair followed closely on the heels of the Miami disaster, few were left who thought the presidential election had not ended. And in any sense that mattered, it had.

All that was left, then, was to see how far the Nixon tide carried. Most professionals, Democratic and Republican, agreed that if Nixon received over 60 percent of the vote, his party would have at least a decent chance of winning both the Senate and the House. This aim would be helped by a light turnout, in which the probable stay-at-homes would be anti-McGovern Democrats likely to vote Democratic for lesser offices.

The turnout was light — only 55 percent, the lowest since 1948. Nixon won the popular vote, 61 to 38 percent, a margin within a single point of those predicted by Gallup and Harris, and the biggest Republican popular victory since 1920. Nixon won 49 of the 50 states, the best any Republican has ever done, and carried the Electoral College 521 to 17, also an easy Republican record.

But in the races for the House and Senate, and even for lower offices such as state legislator, it was as though the presidential election had never occurred. The Nixon tide was not a tide at all, but a kind of political laser that obliterated one target and no others. The new Senate, 57-43 Democratic instead of 55-45, will be about three votes more liberal than the one Nixon found so refractory in 1971-72. The new House, 244-191 instead of 256-179, will be a shade more conservative, but Nixon won all his first-term House votes anyway. Republicans lost a net of one governorship and suffered a slight erosion in control of state legislative bodies. The two-seat Senate loss was the first GOP Senate erosion since — 1964.

Adding to the impression of nothing having happened, of things having returned to Square One, is the fact that the Congress is a virtual carbon copy of the one that faced Nixon in January, 1969, following his 43 percent first-term victory. That House was 243-192, one seat more Republican than now, and that Senate was 57-43, exactly the same as now.

What, then, of realignment? Well, a realignment did occur in one region — the South. McGovern did not get more than 33 percent in a single Southern state. It was the first time in history that the Republicans had won more than half the Southern states — and they won them all. In presidential races for the foreseeable future, and barring a comeback by third-party conservative populism, the South is once again "solid" in presidential elections — for the Republican party.

The pattern for lesser offices is of course less dramatic, but there is a trend and it is clear. The Republicans have 7 of the 22 Southern Senate seats (10 of 26 if Oklahoma and Kentucky are included), 2 more than before. They have 34 of 108 House seats, 7 more than before and easily an all-time record. The figure after the 1960 election was 7 House seats and no senators. The GOP gained one governorship in North Carolina, for a total of 3 out of 11, and nearly added the governorship of Texas for the first time. The first Southern GOP governor in this century was elected in 1966. Republicans increased their numbers in every state legislative body that had an election; the party has a long way to go, but it has history on its side. This becomes particularly evident when the three Upper South states — Tennessee, Virginia, and North Carolina — are examined. If realignment is in process throughout the South, in these northernmost Southern states it has already occurred. Republicans now govern all three states. They have four of the six senators, and the other two are conservative Democrats, one of whom was elected as an independent. With a 1972 gain of 2, Republicans now have 16 of the region's 29 House seats, with solid majorities in Virginia (7-3) and Tennessee (5-3). Only the Democratic-controlled state legislatures and courthouses have managed to withstand the realigning tide.

Incumbents, particularly in the House and Senate, remain as difficult to defeat in the South as elsewhere, but there is no further question that the GOP Southern Strategy, culminating in the Nixon Administration with the symbolic appointments of Haynsworth and Carswell and the opposition to busing, has worked. In the future, Democratic presidential nominees will have to win by taking 270 of the 388 electoral votes beyond the South, Kentucky, and Oklahoma. It can be done, but it won't be easy.

The other major element of the 1972 returns that has a whiff of realignment about it is Nixon's showing among Roman Catholics. According to post-election estimates, Richard Nixon became the first Republican since well before the New Deal to win a majority of Catholic voters. In his first term, Nixon helped this process along significantly with his social conservatism, his opposition to abortion and busing, and his firm if belated support for tax credits for parents of private-school children. But at least equally responsible for his remarkable showing were the views of his opponent and the life-style of his opponent's supporters. The trend of Catholics toward a more conservative stance in the socio-political spectrum is not a new development and is likely to continue, but the more recent Catholic-Republican trend is more problematic. If Edward Kennedy is the Democratic nominee in 1976, Republicans will have trouble holding their Catholic gain unless President Nixon delivers on his promise of parochial school aid, keeps taxes down, and makes considerably greater progress in reducing street crime. Another desideratum is more Catholic appointments to visible administration jobs, with the jackpot being a non-Irish, Catholic Republican on the Supreme Court.

Realignment in presidential elections is important, but true realignment — the kind that enables a party *and* its philosophy to govern effectively — is something else. That it did not occur in 1972 is at least partly the fault of the kind of campaign run by Nixon and his aids. First, there is the obvious failure of the campaign to devote more than token assistance to Republicans running for lesser office. If, as is widely believed

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by professionals of both parties, the presidential election was effectively over by August at the latest, there is no excuse for the President's decision not to help other candidates. The campaign was run as if Nixon were in a neck-and-neck race, as though the slightest use of the forbidden word "Republican" would have instantly triggered a stampede of prospective Nixon voters into the McGovern ranks.

In truth, there was very little danger of this. In polls taken throughout the last three months of the campaign, most anti-McGovern Democrats and independents were not merely toying with the idea of deserting McGovern, but were absolutely determined to do so no matter what else was said and done in the campaign. Even if a Nixon appeal for lesser Republican candidates had failed, there is no reason to believe that these voters would have switched to McGovern. He was too thoroughly discredited for that. Moreover, the fact that Nixon is a Republican is hardly the country's best-kept political secret. He has, after all, run on the party's national ticket in five of the last six elections, the highest identification of a single man with a party in all of American history. In elections when he was not on the ticket, from 1954 up to and including 1970, he played the role of the slashing, abrasive party leader. No one wanted him to repeat, as a president seeking a second term, the tone of those midterm performances, but the notion that large numbers of moderate-to-conservative Democrats would have gone to McGovern as a result of being reminded that Nixon is a Republican is, in the circumstances, ludicrous.

A second reason for the Republican failure may have been the Watergate disclosures. Most poll data confirm two facts about Watergate: one, that Democratic charges and newspaper accounts had increasing impact on the voters as the campaign progressed and, two, that the disclosures hurt Nixon's candidacy little if at all. It is at least a possibility that millions of voters, disturbed by Watergate but totally alienated by McGovern, decided to rein in the administration by voting Democratic for lesser offices. A major motivation behind the ticket-splitting trend in recent elections is the growing desire of the electorate not to put too much power in any one place, lest it be abused. November 7 was the king of all ticket-splitting elections, and Watergate may have contributed significantly to this result. Needless to say, the Republican party cannot prevail against serious opposition if large numbers of Americans come to equate a Republican administration with cynicism and corruption.

But the failure of realignment in 1972 goes, I think, considerably deeper than temporary issues or tactics. Fundamental realignments of the past — 1828, 1860, 1896, 1932 — have turned on an overwhelming issue or cognate set of issues that divided the whole country into a majority and a minority to such an extent that the division took on party lines. In 1828 and 1932 the overriding issue was control of the nation's destiny by a narrow, old-fashioned, albeit talented elite. In 1860, the issues were slavery and Union, and the country divided geographically. In 1896, the nation's miners and rural folk captured a party more thoroughly than McGovern ever dreamed of, and threatened to destroy America's industrial centers by their insistence on a single panacea, the free coinage of silver. The rural South and West voted solidly for Bryan, but the industrial East and Midwest won a victory and forged a majority for stable progress that endured until the Depression.

There was no such landmark issue in 1972. George McGovern tried to introduce one — Vietnam — but that attempt was, as the *Washington Post* stated in its post-election editorial, his single most disastrous error of the campaign. "Looking back on it now," the *Post* said, "one can easily see the magnitude of the mistake that was committed in making the Vietnam war and people's revulsion against it the centerpiece of the Democratic presidential campaign. And that is not only (or even especially) because Mr. Nixon held all the high cards. Rather it was because the heritage of the Vietnam war remained the most politically divisive and emotionally destructive element within the Democratic party itself, the thing above all others that tended to aggravate tensions between class, generation, and region, and to bring forward suspicion, self-justification, painful memory, and the rest. The McGovern campaign thus became exclusionary in a special way. It could not and did not reach out beyond certain limits." Instead, when in the decisive summer period the McGovern people began to realize that Vietnam wouldn't do the trick, they branched briefly into other issues — tax reform, redistribution, and the rest — that contracted the McGovern base even further. In the end, the election transcended the issues, including Vietnam, and became a referendum on George McGovern, his supporters, and what their coming to power would mean to the fabric of American society.

That being said, it should not be forgotten that insofar as Nixon used issues, they were conservative issues: peace through strength, no surrender in Indochina, anti-busing, anti-crime, anti-tax. But no one issue caught on in such a way that its onus spread beyond McGovern and his immediate circle to the rest of the Democratic party. There was no realignment issue.

My own feeling is that of all the issues that sank McGovern, a single one stands out as a pro-Republican realignment issue of the future: taxation and its inseparable companion, the size and function of government. In the past decade the growth of Federal programs and spending has accelerated to the extent that the country must make a landmark decision on what government is all about. Either taxes will rise, or government will be drastically reduced. There is no third way this side of gigantic deficits and economic chaos.

By its very nature the spending-and-tax issue is one that cannot be regarded as the aberration of a single, presidential Democrat such as McGovern. If President Nixon were to mount a crusade against the size of government, the Democratic-controlled House and Senate would have to say yes or no. If they said yes, the Republican Administration would get the lion's share of the credit for obvious reasons. If they said no, and the President convinces the country that the answer must be yes, then the Republican party will have a realigning issue whose effects will be felt at all levels in 1976 and at some in 1974. For this is an issue that has to do not only with the presidency, but with the entire Congress and entire Democratic party as well.

That the President is considering moving in this direction is clear from an interview he gave to the *Washington Star-News* two days before the election. Here are just a few of his comments: "This country has enough on its plate in the way of huge new spending programs, social programs throwing dollars at problems.... Reforms using money more effectively will be the mark of this ad-

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ministration.... I honestly believe that government in Washington is too big and too expensive.... We can do the job better with fewer people.... I am convinced that the total tax burden of the American people — federal, state, and local — has reached the breaking point. It can go no higher.... It is our responsibility to find a way to reform our government institutions so that this new spirit of independence, self-reliance, and pride that I sense in the American people can be nurtured."

If these are the dominant themes of his second administration, realignment under President Nixon may not be quite as dead as political Washington thinks it is.

Alan Reynolds:

Deficits, Controls, and Unflation

"The policy proposals that are being made in the U.S. today are all a reflection of the ideas of the late 1930s."

— Milton Friedman

"Faced with the choice between changing one's mind and proving that there is no need to do so, almost everyone gets busy on the proof."

— John Kenneth Galbraith

We aren't all Keynesians now. Even fewer of us are Galbraithians. Yet, we have drifted into policies based on these quaint old notions, even though the underlying theories are contradicted by simple logic and complicated research.

To spend more than it collects in taxes, the government must create or borrow money. The relevant distinction between a Keynesian and a monetarist is that the Keynesian believes that deficits *per se* will increase output or prices, while the monetarist says that any expansionary effect arises mainly from the fact that new currency or checking accounts are usually created to pay for the government's new bonds. To separate "fiscal" from monetary effects, let's assume that the money removed from Mr. A's wallet — to pay for the bonds — is exactly matched by the number of dollars put into Mr. B's hands by the government's deficit spending: i.e., the deficits does not give rise to any increase in the money supply. On the face of it, one would surely expect this transfer of dollars from Mr. A to Mr. B to have no effect whatsoever on total spending. Nor is it obvious why the composition of spending — the division between consumption, investment, and government — should affect the total of income in the short run.

The true-blue Keynesian, however, could reply that Mr. A was sitting on a specific type of "liquidity trap" full of "idle money." Since Mr. A could care less whether he sits on money or bonds (because he expects the capital loss from falling bond prices to exactly offset the bonds' yield in interest), the government can unload bundles of bonds on the poor fellow and get those "speculative" holdings of "idle money" rolling again. One way of generalizing this argument is to say that velocity is higher in government bureaucracies than in the private sector.[1]

In reality, the government can't continually peddle billions of dollars worth of bonds, year after year, without bidding-up interest rates. Even if there were some evidence for a "liquidity trap" — which there isn't[2] — the amount of idle dollars would not be infinite. In the absence of money-creation, there is a limited amount of funds available for stocks, bonds, mortgages, and the like. To get people to part with more money, the government has to sweeten the deal with higher interest rates (which makes other potential claimants on the limited amount of loanable funds follow suit).

Our hypothetical stubborn Keynesian is thus forced to conclude that this rise in interest rates, resulting from financing the deficit, will not reduce private spending, because investors and consumers will want to borrow just as much no matter what the cost (don't ask where they will get the money, after the government takes its slice). By taking this heroic leap of faith, the Keynesian can also dismiss the effect of the money supply on output or prices, because Keynesians steadfastly refuse to acknowledge that the supply of money will affect spending except by affecting interest rates. Specifically, Keynesians do not even mention that an excess of real cash balances over the amount normally held might just possibly affect markets for goods and labor, as well as for bonds.

Indeed, an up-dated "Keynesian" argument says the rise of interest rates, induced by government bond sales, will not only *not* reduce private spending, but actually *increase* it. This is because at higher interest rates it becomes more costly for people to hold money (which earns no interest), so they hold less of it and the rate of spending (velocity) increases. The demand for money *is* somewhat responsive to interest rates, but the effect on velocity of the comparatively minor interest rate variations associated with financing deficits is far outweighed by other effects: (1) the government's borrowing crowds out a roughly equivalent amount of private borrowing; (2) if reduced money holdings did raise price or output, people would begin holding more money again, because it would take more dollars to satisfy all the reasons why money is held; and (3) higher interest rates reduce demand for investment funds, state and local government borrowing, and mortgages.

The obvious conclusion is that the expansionary impact of deficits mainly depends on whether or not they are financed with new money: i.e., that "fiscal policy" is usually a roundabout type of monetary policy. Specifically, if new government bonds were all sold to the public (rather than to the Federal Reserve or commercial banks), there would be no increase in the money supply, and any expansionary effect would rest on the unlikely effect of deficit spending in increasing velocity. For deficits to be financed by sales of bonds to the public, however, interest rates on government bonds would have to be much more attractive than has been possible under law and Federal Reserve policy (Professor Gordon Tullock has calculated that the real value of federal debt held by the American public has actually *fallen* from $252 billion in 1948 to $152 billion in 1971—expressed in 1963 dollars). Conversely, if we want to increase the money supply, this can be done without deficits by simply buying outstanding bonds with new money. In 1966 we had a deficit *without* monetary expansion and the result was a mild recession; in 1968 we reduced the deficit with a tax surcharge, but the money supply continued to rise — and so did the rate of inflation.

So much for the theory. A large body of research clearly indicates that:

(1) All significant inflations and deflations have been preceded by sudden changes in the rate of growth of the money supply;[3]

(2) The money supply can be controlled within sufficiently narrow limits if Federal Reserve open market sales and purchases of bonds are directed toward affecting the supply of currency and bank reserves;[4]

(3) The factors that cause velocity to vary are more predictable than the (non-tautological) relationship between investment and income;[5]

(4) Unpredicatable lagged responses and the absence of omniscience make *ad hoc* variations in fiscal and monetary policy counter-productive;[6]

(5) Various interest rates move up and down together, and do affect several types of spending.[7]

TOWARD MEANINGFUL REFORM:

It follows that Congress should pass a law instructing the Federal Reserve to keep increases in the money supply within, say, a zero-to-four percent range. Better still, replace the Fed's Open Market Committee with a computer programmed to achieve such monetary stability.

Perhaps even more important, the Federal Reserve must be expressly prohibited from its recurring habit of trying to keep interest rates low by making new money plentiful. This policy causes price-inflation and eventually *raises* nominal interest rates, because lenders demand higher rates to compensate for the expected erosion in purchasing power of the dollars with which they will be repaid. The idea that high interest rates are a sign of "tight money" is the opposite of the truth: High interest rates usually contain an inflation premium, made necessary by an earlier increase in the supply of money.

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Artificial controls on rising interest rates must also be avoided, since they simply make more people anxious to borrow and fewer people willing to lend. The first to lose out under interest ceilings are the relatively "poor risks," namely, small businessmen, innovators, and low-income families. Fairly high interest rates have been a necessary part of all periods of prosperity — they allocate a limited amount of loanable funds to the most productive uses (government's inexcusable interest-subsidies to the contrary notwithstanding).

The Meany-Samuelson proposal to control dividends, incidentally, would simple leave firms with more funds for re-investment, so that stockholders would receive more of their income in the form of capital gains rather than as dividends. The only significant effect would be to keep more equity capital tied-up in existing firms. Controls on profits simply encourage padded expense accounts and other waste.

On the international scene, different rates of inflation among countries will cause fixed relationships between their currencies to break down continually. From 1964 to 1969 the West German wholesale price index remained the same, while ours rose by over 12 percent. This shift of relative prices, with fixed exchange rates, made German goods cheap in the United States, and made American goods costly for Germans — hence, a balance of payments problem. The choice is between continuing crises and revaluations, or gradual adjustments of flexible exchange rates. With flexible rates, foreign buyers will (like United States citizens) accept dollars which cannot be redeemed for gold, because those dollars can be redeemed for merchandise at realistic prices. The markets for gold and currencies should be totally free.

WHAT IS FULL EMPLOYMENT?

In principle, there is a "normal" level of unemployment determined by the costs of acquiring information about job availability, the costs of moving, minimum wage laws, occupational licensing, union monopolization of trades, and so on. Given congressional oppositon to freedom in labor markets, the normal rate of unemployment is higher than necessary, but it could never approach zero. In any case, we can discover the normal rate by observing the effect of an expansionary monetary policy. If unemployment is too high because of "insufficient demand," monetary stimulus will not bid up prices, but will be spent in putting idle men and machines back to work. This has been the case during the 1971-72 recovery, but there are many indications that loose money is beginning to pull up prices.

The notion that 4 percent unemployed is normal for 1973 — and that we should budget accordingly — is a completely arbitrary assumption. The Keynesian prophecies that expansionary monetary policies will not raise prices, simply because unemployment is above 4 percent, are therefore based on some sort of upside-down Say's Law: i.e., that demand automatically creates its own supply. Keynes himself explicitly denied this, and even Galbraith correctly notes that unemployment today involves "a complex fitting of highly diverse qualifications to highly diverse needs."

The related idea that inflation automatically cures unemployment (The Phillips Curve) is based on the unlovely art of deceiving people. When inflation is new, many job-seekers mistake a general rise of wages for a high *relative* offer. They therefore cease searching for a job, and unemployment is reduced below the normal level. Some wages usually fail to keep up with the trend of prices, thereby increasing short-run profits in these industries. As soon as inflation comes to be expected, however, employees adjust their wage demands to compensate for rising living costs. Business thus returns to normal profitability and many employees are laid-off or voluntarily choose to search for better "real" wages (if such searching for jobs is "unemployment," then all persons who work in employment agencies are likewise "unemployed").

The course of interest rates during inflation is roughly analogous to that of wages. When the economy first receives

an injection of new money, interest rates fall because funds are abundant. The initial effect is a stimulus to business and consumer spending, both through the cheapness of credit, and through the direct effect of higher money balances (as a proportion of wealth) than people wish to hold. Since supplies are relatively fixed, this boost in total demand creates general price inflation. Once this inflation is anticipated, however, lenders demand higher interest rates to compensate for it, and consumers hold more cash since it now takes more dollars to satisfy all the reasons for which money is held (each dollar can now buy fewer goods, provide less security, etc.). In short, inflation cannot cure unemployment once people are wise to it. [8]

CONTROLLING WHAT — AND WHY?

Space limitations prohibit repeating all on my reservations about wage and price controls, so I will summarize a few past observations — with parenthetical references to the appropriate issues of *National Review*:

(1) From October of 1970 to July of 1971, the annual rate of inflation dropped fairly steadily from 5.8 percent to 2.4 percent. In September of this year, the CPI rose by 6 percent. Excluding the sore issue of food prices, non-food commodity prices have risen at a slightly faster rate under Phase Two (3.0 percent) than in the first half of 1971 (2.9 percent). The recovery also began in October 1970, and the index of leading economic indicators (which forecasts recovery) rose more rapidly in the six months before Phase One than in the subsequent six months. If controls have done anything but reverse favorable trends (and the price indexes surely obscure hidden price increases and quality declines), the results are far too trivial to justify the distortions, inequities, and loss of freedom (*National Review*, 8-18-72, 9-1-72).

(2) Galbraith told us that "only prices that are ... set by unions and strong corporations need to be (or should be) controlled. Prices of farm products, of most services and prices of small manufacturers are still subject to market influences." The archaic theory behind this is illogical (*National Review* 9-24-71), and the facts are exactly backwards. Price increases in corporate manufacturing have long trended about 10 percent *below* the price level, and 20 percent below the prices of services. Federal employees, far from facing Galbraithian predictions of "distress and turmoil," have had 15 percent larger wage increases from 1965-71 than the corporate sector (*National Review* 6-9-72). Food price increases were not much of a problem until controls caused the predicted diversion of demand into such uncontrollable sectors (*National Review* 4-14-72).

(3) The temporary reprieve from inflation in April was to be expected from monetarist theory, and it was predicted (*National Review*, 2-4-72).

(4) Seven European nations have imposed wage-price controls from 1963 to 1971, and they experienced average price inflations of over 50 percent. The only four industrial nations which made little or no use of controls had average price increases of less than 32 percent in the same period (*National Review* 12-31-71). Obviously, controls don't *cause* inflation, but they encourage the monetary irresponsibility that does cause inflation. [9]

(5) If unions or oligopolies can create inflation, why did they wait until a period of surplus money to do so? Besides, an increased *share* going to, say, employees in medicine or construction doesn't increase total income: the person paying higher wages loses as much purchasing power as is gained by the recipients.[10] It should not surprise anyone that wages and prices reacted slowly to the moderate monetary slowdown of 1969-70 — people had just been burnt by several years of unexpected inflation. It takes time for monetary changes to work themselves out, and workers will believe price stability if and when they see it.

If it isn't already clear that patch-

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work remedies do nothing to solve inflation or unemployment, it soon will be. If we are serious about reducing unemployment, governments must clear away all the obstacles to working that they have created (licensed taxis, plumbers, and tree surgeons; minimum wage laws to keep southern blacks from competing with the unions; regional labor union monopolies, etc.), and governments must remove all the incentives they have created for people to remain idle (welfare that stops, and payroll taxes that start, with the first dollar earned).

If we are serious about eliminating inflation, Congress must limit the Federal Reserve Board's propensity to tinker with interest rates and bounce the money supply up and down. The economy is remarkably resilient — it can even adjust to controls, by diverting resources from areas where they are needed, though open inflation would be much more efficient. Besides, the government has no business telling people what their labor or property is worth. If the government insists on taxing money holdings with a 3-4 percent inflation, the economy can easily adjust to that too, by adding a 3-4 percent cost-of-living adjustment to wages, prices, pensions, and bonds. The main thing is for the monetary authority to pick any course and stay on it, so that people can make realistic plans. One of the biggest myths of the century is the idea that government activities have stabilized the "business cycle." The truth is that business activities have done a surprisingly good job of stabilizing the government cycle.

Footnotes

[1] Actually, velocity is higher in business than in government: R.T. Selden, "The Postwar Rise in the Velocity of Money: A Sectoral Analysis" *Journal of Finance* (12-61).

[2] Meltzer, A.H. "Yet Another Look At The Low Level Liquidity Trap" *Econometrica* (7-63).

[3] Sprinkel, B. *Money and Markets* (Irwin 1971); Friedman, M. *The Optimum Quantity of Money* (Aldine 1969) Ch. 10.

[4] Meltzer, A. "Controlling Money" Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis *Review* (May 1969); Cagan, P. *Determinants and Effects of Changes in the Stock of Money 1875-1960* (N.B.E.R. 1965); Aschheim, J. *Techniques of Monetary Control* (Johns Hopkins 1961).

[5] Laidler, D. *The Demand for Money* (International Text 1969).

[6] Cagan, P. & Schwartsz, A. "How Feasible Is A Flexible Monetary Policy?" (unpublished address, Charlottesville, Va. 10-20-72); Lewis, W. *Federal Fiscal Policy in the Postwar Recessions* (Brookings Institute 1962).

[7] Cagan, P. *Recent Monetary Policy and the Inflation* (American Enterprise Institute 1971) pp. 27-34; Kessel, R. *The Cyclical Behavior of the Term Structure of Interest Rates* (N.B.E.R. 1965).

[8] Phelps, E. *Microeconomic Foundations of Employment and Inflation Theory* (Norton 1970).

[9] For more detailed discussions see my "The Case Against Wage and Price Controls" reprinted in *Annual Editions Readings in Economics '72* (Dushkin 1972); Yeager, L. *Monetary Policy and Economic Performance* (American Enterprise Institute 1972); Miller, R. & Williams, R. *The New Economics of Richard Nixon* (Harpers Magazine Press 1972).

[10] Harris, C.L. *Innovations in Tax Policy and Other Essays* (University of Hartford 1972) p. 73 n.

William Schneider, Jr.:

A National Security Agenda for the Second Nixon Administration

An essay which dwells on a subject which has not yet come to pass, namely, a second term as president for Richard Nixon, is a rather risky business at best, for providence often makes the most sober reflection appear foolish. Nevertheless, it is an exercise which merits attention in the case of national security policy because the problems reflect concerns facing any president, not merely those facing the incumbent. The second term of the Nixon Administration is especially interesting because of the watershed character of Mr. Nixon's stewardship over several basic national security policy issues in the past four years. Ironically, it is precisely in those areas of concern — alliance relations (both in Asia and Europe) and strategic arms limitation policy — where the president has been most energetic, that are the most urgent items on the agenda for the second term.

As of this writing (early October), the casual reader is bored to anesthesia with rumors of an impending settlement of the conflict in Vietnam. Indeed, 1972 is a vintage year for selling out traditional perceptions of U.S. alliance interests (hence the secure place of "alliance relations" as a major second-term agenda element), and one cannot truthfully claim surprise that the axe may fall on Vietnam as well. There is a special irony with regard to Vietnam, for President Nixon's decisions on Vietnam are unquestionably the noblest of his presidency. One can only recall recent history wistfully and wonder what the world would have been like if Hitler had been stopped when he attempted to re-militarize the Rhine in 1936 (*The Alternative*, Vol. 6, No. 1, "A Rhineland Fantasy" by Jacqueline Kasun), or Eisenhower had intervened in the East German uprising of 1953 or the Hungarian revolt of 1956, or if Kennedy had fully supported the Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961. Our history is littered with the shattered illusions of foreign supporters whose faith in the United States was crushed by the intractable reticence of too many American Commanders-in-Chief. With regard to Vietnam, President Nixon stands virtually without peer. His decisions to conduct military operations in Cambodia in 1970, and in 1972 to bomb and mine North Vietnamese ports in the face of a Vietnik PR-blitz has few precedents in presidential courage and resolve. The Vietnam issue is by no means settled, but the manner in which it is eventually settled will have awesome implications for U.S. foreign policy for years and perhaps decades.

The nature of a "disgraceful" settlement in Vietnam has been discussed by other commentators (e.g., Herman Kahn in *Can We Win In Vietnam?*, Pergamon, New York, 1968), and generally involves an agreement which would effectively eliminate the chances for South Vietnamese political survival, however papered-over with rhetoric to the contrary. The consequences of recent U.S. policy in East and Southeast Asia with an honorable settlement of the Vietnam issue requires a policy for the next four years of facilitating the adjustment of U.S. Asian alliance partners to a changing U.S. role in the region. The consequences of a "disgraceful" settlement in Vietnam requires a policy of facilitating the adjustment of U.S. Asian (and probably European) alliance partners to early U.S. withdrawal from serious substantive participation in most, if not all, major U.S. military alliances.

While it is risky to predict the continuity of behavior of an incumbent president with a four-year track record of discontinuous change, this writer opts for continuity with regard to Vietnam. This rather weighty presumption having been made, the burden of U.S. policy efforts in Asia in the next four years needs to be devoted to helping U.S. alliance partners assimilate the "catalytic" rather than direct role of U.S. policy in the region. (Failure to do so can have very serious near term consequences. An acquaintance of this writer, a long-time West Berlin resident and an intimate of Willy Brandt, the current West German Chancellor — at least through the November 19th West German election — has observed that Brandt's attitude toward the Soviet bloc changed in 1961 from opposition to accommodation following President Kennedy's collapse of nerve in the face of Khruschev's bombast in failing to react significantly to the Berlin Wall. Brandt perceived that the United States would not be willing in the long run to defend Europe from the Soviet Union.) Based upon the contemporary and anticipated capabilities of U.S. allies in Asia, the Nixon doctrine of limiting support to logistics, advisory, training, and diplomatic efforts while offering direct U.S.

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military intervention (excepting advanced technology skills such as air and Naval bombardment) only in the case of overt aggression is entirely appropriate. The habit of dependence on the United States for direct security support can only be changed gradually and carefully, and replaced with an appropriate substitute. Such care will require more persuasive and determined efforts by the President to assure congressional support for adequate funding of military assistance and related U.S. capabilities. Moreover, the President must assign a higher diplomatic priority to the maintenance of the U.S. alliance structure in Asia (including South Korea and the Republic of China) than to the care and feeding of our adversaries.

The agenda in Europe is more subtle, but hardly less important. The most significant peacetime alliance in U.S. history, NATO, is in an advanced state of disrepair due to neglect and some malfeasance since the mid-1960s. This decay in the NATO alliance could hardly come at a more inopportune time.

Preparatory discussions in Helsinki will begin on November 22nd for the Soviet-inspired thirty-four nation Conference on European Security and Cooperation (CESC). This conference holds virtually unlimited promise of politically neutralizing the NATO alliance while facilitating the Soviet stranglehold over the people of Eastern Europe. At approximately the same time, the U.S.-proposed Conference on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) between NATO and the Warsaw Pact should begin. State and Defense Department professionals agree — virtually to a man — that U.S. participation in both conferences does not justify more than the smallest movement in the political seismograph calculating costs and benefits. Nevertheless, by a series of bizarre missteps by the United States too complex to describe here, participation is assured.

During the next four years, the President must take decisive steps to defend the United States and NATO from political-military erosion at the CESC and MBFR. Such a defensive position necessarily implies stubborn insistence at CESC on the discussion of such issues as Soviet restrictions on emigration, the dissemination of information, and economic restrictions on firms trading with the Soviet Union with equal resistance to the discussion of such favorite Soviet themes as European economic cooperation and political association with the United States. Similarly the NATO focus at MBFR should be upon restrictions on Soviet maneuvers (the preferred Soviet technique for mounting an invasion, such as in Czechoslovakia) and eliminating the Soviet's anti-revolutionary divisions (e.g., the twenty tank divisions in East Germany) in Eastern Europe. Soviet efforts to trim West German and U.S. forces in the Central Front region should be met with glacial U.S. resistance.

At the same time, the President should seek a revision in NATO strategy to better coincide with the realities of the U.S.-Soviet strategic balance. The failure of the United States to respond to the Soviet strategic nuclear buildup in the late 1960s has cost the United States, at least for the foreseeable future, the ability to credibly retain the nuclear "first-use" option in Europe against Soviet expansion. While the details supporting this assertion are beyond the scope of this essay, suffice it to say that NATO's conventional force posture must soon be revised from one which is primarily defensive (delaying a Soviet conventional assault while the nuclear decision is made) to one where NATO forces are credibly prepared to wage war throughout Eastern Europe if attacked. Such a change in basic strategy is necessary if the NATO alliance is to remain a believable military organization over the next decade.

The final task which should be on the Nixon national security agenda for the second term has a most direct relationship to the security of the U.S. strategic nuclear defense policy. This policy is, of course, dominated by the strictures imposed by the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. The major task for the next four years is to obtain an agreement involving ICBMs and SLBMs (intercontinental and submarine-launched ballistic missiles) which conforms to the Jackson Amendment (i.e., parity in these systems) to the Interim SALT Agreement on Offensive Weapons before further discussions on any other elements of the strategic equation are considered. Simultaneously, the President should employ the full weight of his office to provide an adequate R & D and procurement mobilization base to permit the United States to vastly expand and modernize U.S. strategic forces if such an agreement is not forthcoming. Such an effort means more than money and presidential attention — it requires a personnel policy for key national security policy positions which will install individuals whose beliefs reflect presidential resolve. Such a policy has too often been lacking in the first term.

The agenda proposed here is a large, but not impossible order to fill. The nature of the 1972 campaign has drawn battle lines on national security policy more sharply than they have been drawn for a generation. Should President Nixon win with a margin approaching that attained by Eisenhower, he will have an overpowering mandate to pursue sensible policies. We can only hope that the renowned Nixon political antennae are sensitive to the opportunity.

Tom Taggert:

Tory Socialists and the Second American Revolution

It is widely commented in the eastern press that Richard Nixon will devote considerably more attention during his second term to domestic matters. One can only hope that this is merely another slur upon our President. The country has had a difficult enough time surviving the slight notice Nixon has given home affairs during the past four years and, aside from his stumbling upon a burning bush, it is difficult to conceive what chance we would have if he gave serious thought to the subject. Peace of mind dictates that we believe foreign affairs will continue to preoccupy him and that the only threat to our life and liberty will come from Congress.

Congressional hooliganism is a hazard we can reasonably live with since it is only sporadically menacing. Who can recall in recent years a serious infringement of our freedom that originated in Congress? It is only when the Executive gets restless and starts rooting around for new solutions to all those old problems to which we have long since accommodated ourselves that we need lock the doors and take down the shooting piece. Most Americans have intuitively come to understand that our democracy is safest when presidents are busy building democracy in some distant land. It's tough on the foreigners, but we pay them generously for the inconvenience.

Some critics have noted the failure of the President's "New American Revolution" and the stillbirth of his "New Federalism" and concluded that Richard Nixon has not had a domestic program to speak of. This is unfair to the President. Although the proposals in his 1971 State of the Union Message have failed to materialize into a substantive framework for a Nixon domestic policy, he has nevertheless succeeded in piecing together a patchwork program sufficiently comprehensive to support the assertion that he accomplished more in his first term than to proclaim a revolution to which no revolutionaries came. Any man who could propose to the American people a "Full Employment Budget," and do so with a straight face, deserves credit for considerable domestic achievement. Add to this Amtrack, FAP, the bailout of Lockheed, the vigorous advocacy of the SST, and the introduction of wage and price controls, and the conclusion is inevitable: this fellow has made quite a domestic record. All it lacks is a label, and the most accurate one is "Tory Socialism."

Tory Socialism has its origins in the political sagacity of Benjamin Disraeli and Count von Metternich. The British Prime Minister concluded that it was electorally expedient for a Conservative Government to provide the electorate with a Liberal program, thus foreclosing any programmatic temptation for the voters to opt for the opposition. Metternich earlier had concluded that it was unfortunately necessary for princes to give their people domestic "reform" if

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they wished to maintain a free hand in the conduct of foreign affairs. Nixon, the great synthesizer, took these kernels of wisdom and formulated a domestic policy designed to pre-empt the programs of his domestic opposition and buy the flexibility he required to achieve that much heralded "full generation of peace."

History will surely not underestimate (as most Republicans have done) the major contribution to this exercise made by the President's resident intellectuals. Vividly, I trust, the Schlesinger of this administration will portray the charming, witty, and learned Dr. Patrick Moynihan entreating a Republican President to the role of History's Baby by the

Great American Series

Most American politicians have the same problems as most American hobos.

George Nathan

mere act of salvaging OEO, Model Cities, and a score of other Great Society programs that Candidate Nixon has promised to scrap, or the swinging, erudite Dr. Henry Kissinger tutoring the widely traveled and experienced Mr. Nixon in the subtleties of Big Power politics which make no allowance for domestic diversions. Tory Socialism as the President came to understand and implement it was a gamble that a free hand in foreign affairs and a free shot at a second term would result from a generous program of free handouts at home.

No doubt Richard Nixon believes that it paid off, although even he must recognize the contribution that George McGovern made to his re-election. Nevertheless, in the Nixon White House, where what works is what's right, there is bound to be new confidence in the merits of Tory Socialism as the wave of the future. My advice is to sack-up your silver-clad coins and unbacked Federal Reserve Notes and bury them in the back yard while there's still time to save something.

Students of Tory Socialism will recognize it as a uniquely Republican contribution to American political theory. Untainted by the Democrat's heresy of re-allocating wealth from the rich to the poor, Tory Socialism contemplates the doling out of goodies evenhandedly to those at the top and the bottom of the economic heap. It assumes that the Have-A-Lots and the Have-Nothings can both profit at the expense of the Have-A-Littles. In that great American tradition, it is the beleagured middle class that gets screwed.

Don't get the idea that the Tory Socialists have any particular grudge against working people; it's just that they can hardly be expected to pay much attention to folks who aren't stirring up a fuss. The young, the black, and the poor deserve something because something is required to keep them quiet. The rich, the well-born, and the successful deserve something because something is required to keep those campaign contributions rolling in. The message George Wallace was attempting to send the Tory Socialists is that the working people in this country are sick and tired of picking up the tab for those with access to the seats of power, whether that access is through membership in the Cosmopolitan Club or residency at Tent City. The message has yet to get through.

The opposition to the American political establishment (of which Richard Nixon is now a member in spite of the attempts of the *New York Times* to blackball him) is often characterized as "Populist." This is only superficially accurate. True, the millions of Republicans and Democrats who responded to George Wallace's call for the dispatch of a message to Washington are resentful, and resentment is a defining characteristic of American populsim. But so are an agrarian origin, racism, and the conviction of victimization by a conspiracy.

The Message Senders come not from the farms and backwoods but from the suburbs and small towns, are anti-busing but not necessarily anti-integration, and direct their resentment not against a faceless conspiracy but against a demonstrable reality. They are not calling for Free Silver, but for an end to social engineering. And this is the key distinction between the so-called "New Populists" and the traditional lot: the politics of resentment emerging in America today is focusing not on bread-and-butter issues but on values.

The problem of the sophisticated commentators who write for the "Time Essay" and other scholarly publications is that they have failed to recognize that the resentful Americans are really of two types: those who constitute the feeling class and resent the failure of traditional American values to fall before the onslaught of their vulgarity, and those who constitute the working class and resent the presumptuousness as well as the vulgarity of those who seek the destruction of values long cherished, adequately tested, and found perfectly satisfactory.

Working people have learned to live with the reality of being economically short-changed by government, but they refuse to acquiesce in the destruction of their value system, their neighborhoods, or their families by government edict. They are willing to put up with the Tory Socialists engaging in political espionage, bailing out incompetent managers of giant corporations, playing footsie with ITT and Continental Grain, sponsoring OEO boondoggles and massive food stamp handouts, but they damn well won't tolerate tinkering with their neighborhood or its schools or the institutionalization of loafing as a nationally subsidized past-time. Most importantly, they won't sit still for anything that threatens the integrity of a family, whether it be abortion on demand, gay liberation, government expropriation of children in the guise of "child development," or the free flow of drugs and pornography.

Richard Nixon, to his political credit, intuitively recognized this and on all but one of these gut issues came down on the right side. What the McGovernites failed to learn from Scammon and Wattenberg is that a Democrat seeking national office today also has to be right on these issues if he wishes to profit from the traditional advantage of his party on bread-and-butter issues.

Millions of Democrats watching the proceedings in Miami Beach last July realized that those now in control of their party speak in tongues; they have absolutely nothing to say that is sympathetic to the aspirations of those Americans who work for a living and expect little more than the opportunity to make life more comfortable for their children than it has been for them. The Tory Socialists didn't win an election on November 7th, the McGovernites lost one. All the advantages of being Disraeli failed to accrue to Richard Nixon.


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He co-opted the opposition's programs, added a few of his own to satisfy the special constituency of Peter Flanigan and Maurice Stans, and the effort was for naught. Against the McGovernites he could have won on a Republican platform.

What the President sensed and what Dr. Moynihan declined to explicate is that the estrangement in American society that Richard Nixon inherited in 1969 was the result of a dissimilarity of moral vision between the elite and the majority that voted for Nixon or Wallace in 1968. To solidify this majority for 1972 the President had only to identify his administration with its moral aspirations; he didn't have to embrace the programs of the discredited administration he succeeded. The President could have developed a domestic program consistent with the values most Americans continue to believe capable of sustaining the good life, and thereby have laid the foundation for a Republican Era, but instead he chose Tory Socialism.

Conservatives should be disappointed but not surprised at the President's choice. A philosopher he is not, nor, in an ideological sense, a man of principle. He is a Fixer, a mechanic who enjoys tinkering with the machinery of government. His persistent goal is to make it work, for what end he has no particular idea: he simply knows that machines are made to run and, by damn, his machine is going to run better than the other fellow's. In a comparative sense he's done all right, but what satisfaction could a man of perspective derive from such an accolade when the standards of comparison consist of the likes of LBJ, JFK, and the General?

America can't afford to come home; the shock would be too great. We are adrift. We have forgotten where we started, we don't understand where we are, and we have no clear idea where we wish to go. Richard Nixon talks of a New American Revolution, but his is a revolution without articulated values, without strategic objectives, without nobility. Who in his right mind would pledge even his Bank Americard in such an endeavor?

No, a revolution of the type America needs requires a leader who can inspire confidence, who can spell out the objectives for which the battle is to be fought, who can identify the enemy and persevere in the struggle. A revolutionist without moral vision is as legitimate as a stripper with falsies.

A second American Revolution must have the same objective as the first: the establishment of a republican regime. The necessity is demonstrated by the subversion in the 1930s and the abandonment in the 1960s of the republican values for which the struggle against George III was waged, and by the acquiescence of this administration in the counter-revolution. A revolutionary leader in America today must understand, as Jefferson, Madison, and Adams did, that republican government is impossible unless accompanied by a republican morality. He must recognize that self interest tempered by a sense of community, liberty restrained by a commitment to order, sentiment untainted by sentimentality, ethics rooted in piety, and authority sanctioned by tradition are indispensible to a society committed to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.

The first business of America is the restoration of the republican order in America. Programmatic innovations of the type proposed by the Tory Socialists are mere bandaids applied to a nation suffocating from a crisis of the spirit, and for this reason alone Tory Socialism is part of the problem, not the solution. This is a time for a priest, yet we have opted for a medicine man. A dispenser of herbs, oils, and home remedies, Richard Nixon can be expected to continue in the next four years the hawking of old wares in new packages, and a public politically numbed by an overdose of unkept promises may not mind the affront.

On the other hand, there is the possibility that after awakening from the slumber induced by the recent campaign, Americans may begin to recognize that this election really settled nothing, that, in fact, being limited to a choice between the Tory Socialists and the McGovernites afforded no viable choice at all on the fundamental issues potentially in dispute. Such recognition, however, will most likely have to be induced by writers, commentators, and political spokesmen who believe that the time is at hand when only a new American Revolution can save us from the fate of earlier republics.

Will it happen? Nixon has succeeded to a large extent in immobilizing the conservative movement that emerged from the Goldwater campaign, particularly that part of its leadership which serves in Congress. But I recall the Second Eisenhower Administration: it was then that conservatism as we know it today came to life as a political reality. I think it is likely that it will get its second wind in a Second Nixon Administration, but whether it will gain enough momentum to launch a successful revolution against the combined strength of the McGovernites and the Tory Socialists is problematical. I for one believe that it depends largely on one man and where he ends up in the ensuing struggle. Should our conservative leaders be willing to make the necessary tactical concessions and should he be willing to commit himself to the necessary strategic goals, it may be done. I look to the Vice President with a great measure of hope, but only time will tell how strong is his heart and how deep is his commitment to a republican order rendered operable by a people imbued with a republican morality.



The Meaning of Watergate

After more than four months' sustained public discussion of the Watergate affair, only two conclusions can be ventured with any degree of confidence. The first is that Watergate is an authentic scandal, a breach of legal and ethical standards which is intolerable in a democracy and which demands punishment and atonement. The second is that what *kind* of a scandal it is, involving what degree of wrongdoing, and demanding what sort of corrective response are matters about which we still know next to nothing. To be sure, there are more than a few suspicions and sinister allegations floating about, but these are not the same thing as real knowledge — and in the absence of such knowledge, we have no way of knowing what a truly just or proper resolution of the entire squalid affair would involve.

Now this, I submit, is a curious state of affairs. What it means is that, in the decisive respect, we don't know any more about Watergate today than we did last June when the story first broke. Somehow, the millions of words that have been uttered by the media and the candidates in the interim have added almost nothing to our understanding. Unquestionably they have brought many details and bits of background to light, but the reliability of this information is still uncertain, and in any event "more detail" is not the same as "better understanding." It's also true that, political morality being the murky subject it is, no amount of information could suffice to lay to rest every conceivable question about the affair. Yet the point remains: in the decisive respect — as a question of what response should be made to the affair — the meaning of Watergate is no clearer now than it was at the beginning.

What accounts for this paradoxical situation, in which huge increments of attention and information seem to produce no increment in public understanding and only modest increments in public concern? The answer, it seems to me, is to be found in the fact that the three institutions which have been primarily

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responsible for sustaining the dialogue on Watergate — the Nixon campaign organization, the McGovern campaign organization, and the news media — share in common a characteristic that sociologists call "functional specialization."

Each of these three organizations has distinctive and specialized goals: for the campaign organizations, it is the election of their candidates; for the news media, it is finding and telling the news. Each has treated Watergate accordingly, from the standpoint of its distinctive concerns and aims. The result has been a flood of data and talk that is highly relevant to the organizations' concerns—but sadly irrelevant to the distinctive concern of the citizen, which in this case is to ascertain the degree of wrongdoing and the location of blame. It is this disjunction between the organizations' goals and the citizen's goals that explains why four months of incessant publicity have succeeded in raising an important issue but have failed to clarify it.

For the Nixon campaign organization, the Watergate affair was a serious threat to its goal of re-electing the President. Since the break-in was an established and undeniable fact, the Nixon campaign had only two general options. One was to make a clean breast of the matter: to explain in every detail how and why the break-in took place, who was involved in the decision-making, where the money came from, how it was disbursed — in short, to tell everything, and then to fire all those involved, to repent publicly, and to promise to mend their ways, in the hope that this would defuse the entire issue and that their transgressions would be forgiven and forgotten. In contrast to this "confessional" approach, there was a second option: admit only that which is undeniably a part of the public record, and to do everything possible to minimize its significance. It was this second option, of course, that the Nixon campaign adopted.

The strategy of minimizing Watergate has proceeded on three fronts. First, there has been an effort to minimize the seriousness of the scandal by treating it as a simple crime, one which is sufficiently dealt with in the courts and which requires no further action or discussion. Second, there has been an effort to minimize the connection between the break-in and the Administration by saying that it was unauthorized, by denying awareness of it at high levels, etc. And third there has been an effort to minimize it informationally, by volunteering no information about it, by resisting the efforts of others to get information about it, and by denying new information (and misinformation) turned up by others.

For the McGovern campaign organization, by contrast, Watergate, far from being a threat, was a golden opportunity to discredit the Nixon Administration and to improve its candidate's chances. Here, too, there were at least two strategies they could have adopted in discussing the affair. First, they could have handled it in an understated way, by letting the facts speak more or less for themselves, by focusing only on the one established incident, by asserting it to be no more than what at a minimum it unquestionably is — an authentic scandal — and by emphasizing the gravity of the affair by treating it with exaggerated sobriety, restraint, and precision. In contrast to this "understated" approach, there was a second option: to overstate the case, to magnify the facts, to treat an event that was damning in itself primarily as a symbol of a larger and more disgraceful general pattern of deceit, corruption, and immorality, by assimilating Watergate to other questionable events as evidence of a much broader and more serious phenomenon.

Of course it was this latter, "hyberbolic" approach which McGovern eventually adopted. Whereas the Nixon campaign was constantly asserting Watergate to represent less than the established facts showed it to be, McGovern continually asserted Watergate to be far more than the known facts indicated. Where the Nixon campaign minimized the extent to which Watergate implicated high officials, McGovern presented it as direct evidence of Nixon's personal immorality and unfitness. Where the Nixon campaign sought to dissociate the Watergate break-in from all other events and actions, McGovern sought to associate it with a long series of incidents in the Nixon Administration itself and in Nixon's personal political history as far back as 1948 and 1950. Whereas the Nixon campaign presented the affair as a "mere" crime, an isolated aberration, McGovern treated it as a symbol of what he asserted to be the corrupt, immoral essence of all Nixon governance. The only thing both sides had in common was an unwillingness to treat the event for what it so plainly was on its surface — an authentic scandal in its own right, requiring serious public attention and appropriate corrective action.

One might think that the news media would have corrected for both candidates' failing. In fact they did not, although to some extent it was within their ability to do so. For there were two different ways in which the media might have handled the Watergate affair. They could have defined it primarily as a controversy between the two candidates; had they used this traditional journalistic formula, they would have printed stories in which one side makes a charge and the other side answers. This sort of coverage relegates the media to a more or less passive role, and places the burden of finding facts and drawing conclusions on the parties to the dispute. But there was a second possibility for the media, and that was to treat this as a scandal which the media themselves, by means of investigative reporting, would uncover bit by bit, day by day. This is of course another traditional journalistic formula, one which casts the news organization in the most active, most sensational, and least neutral of all the roles it characteristically plays.

It has been primarily as a "scandal gradually exposed" rather than as a "controversy between candidates" that the news media have treated the Watergate affair. Their reportage has followed the classic pattern of this particular journalistic formula. The theme of each story has been that of a serious breach of public ethics and of the law being progressively uncovered, and the information presented has been gathered with a view toward illustrating that theme. The emphasis has been on new facts which seem to deepen, broaden, ramify, and magnify the original event. The most shocking facts have been given the most prominent play, and the facts themselves have not always been attributed to named, reliable sources. Information which does not illustrate ever more shocking events or which contradicts the hypothesis of deepening scandal has been de-emphasized or ignored altogether. The result of such coverage has not encouraged a sober, careful assessment by citizens of the extent and character of the Watergate scandal. The tendency in the media has been more to raise questions and suspicions than to answer them with evidence.

And now to the point: each of these three institutions had open to it the option of discussing Watergate calmly, rationally, and honestly, with a view toward what the evidence did and did not show. The Nixon campaign could have taken the "confessional" approach; the McGovern campaign could have chosen the way of understatement rather than hyberbole; the media could have treated the affair as a controversy rather than as a scandal to be exposed. Why, then, did they adopt the other course in each instance?

The answer is simple: the "calm" approach to Watergate was less likely to maximize the distinctive goals and values of each organization than the more "combative" approach.

For instance, there is no reason to think that had the Nixon Administration made a clean breast of things, the issue of Watergate would have died; on the contrary, the probability is that full disclosure would only have further fueled the fire of popular indignation and revulsion that has attended Watergate and that, if allowed to grow, could well have blasted the President out of office. After the Eagleton affair, McGovern was not in a position to make the Watergate issue work for him by being understated: his own credibility was too uncertain, and he was too far behind in the polls. And for the media, which have traditionally had a strong preference for the "scandal" mode of handling events as opposed to the "controversy" formula where both are possible, there was no reason not to

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choose the "scandal" approach, which after all does maximize its distinctive journalistic goals and values better than the "controversy" formula.

As a result, nearly everything printed and said about Watergate these past months has been more or less beside the point. The discourse of the Nixon campaign has clearly failed to zero in on the important questions. It should go without saying that Watergate is something more than a mere crime, a mysterious aberration from the normal routines of the Nixon campaign; it is a true scandal, and as such cannot be left to the courts alone. Presumably there are people who are legally innocent, but who bear some moral or symbolic responsibility for the deliberate commission of a crime as a part of a presidential campaign. The Nixon Administration will have to confront this fact, for if there is not a symbolic "house cleaning" in the near future, then its legitimacy and respectability over the coming four years will suffer serious and permanent damage.

On the other hand, there is no reason to believe at this time that Watergate is, as the news exposes suggest and as Senator McGovern insists, only an incidental symbol of some systematic pattern of immorality, corruption, and malfeasance in office. The other "scandals" to which Watergate has been linked — ITT, milk, wheat, department of dirty tricks, etc. — involve no established malfeasance, and it isn't even clear that anything more than politics-at-its-more-disreputable-as-usual was involved, the sort of politics that practically every candidate and office-holder practices routinely. We can deplore such shady dealings, and we can hold the sort of men who practice them in contempt. But these things do not even come close to adding up to evidence of a systematically corrupt and immoral administration. Indeed, the Watergate affair, though a scandal, is not even the sort of scandal for which we have traditionally thrown rascals out of office. That sort of scandal always involves malfeasance in office, usually in exchange for money. So the news media and McGovern have not truly illuminated this question either.

Then what *is* the meaning of Watergate? We do not really know. It clearly is serious enough to demand decisive action by the Second Nixon Administration to clear its name and reputation. But beyond that, I submit, there is nothing else we can say for sure. Except, perhaps, that the entire episode dramatically illustrates the American system of public discussion at its best (in raising the Watergate question and in keeping it before the public) and at something like its worst (in failing abysmally to illuminate this matter from the citizen's point of view) — and in doing so shows how readily functional specialization is capable of distorting the public discourse.

Eric Brodin:

Hope for Sweden?

Although anti-Americanism still appears to be one of the main ingredients of Sweden's political life, there are encouraging trends which would indicate a reaction to the four decade-long regime of the Social Democrats, which has taken a definite leftward direction since Olof Palme became Premier in 1969. This trend has brought about a counter-reaction toward the Right by many young Swedes, especially the young students who are suffering through the new, rigid, politically motivated, educational reform, as well as by those Swedes with independence, initiative, and a desire to see some concrete results from a hard day's work.

One reaction to the forty-year socialist hegemony, to be sure, has been simply to leave Sweden, and the "brain-drain" by the educated and skilled has been considerable, whether it be businessmen, doctors, dentists, teachers, or engineers. During the past five years 32,876 persons have permanently emigrated and since 1967 the number has increased 1,000 a year. Increasingly, Swedish students study abroad — and after completing their studies they often elect to stay away from Sweden.

But for the young people left behind one of the most important tasks is the advocacy of a non-socialist alternative, and the attempts, through political action, to displace the institutionalized socialists to whom it could be said "ye've sat too long for the good ye've done." During a recently concluded lecture-tour of Sweden, the author had the opportunity to make a personal assessment of three youth organizations that might well contribute to a welcome change in Sweden's political climate in the near future.

Young Conservatives

Although the Conservative party of Sweden (now called Moderate Coalition party) may not be so characterized in the United States, given Sweden's political frame, it is the only party with a clearly defined non-socialist alternative. Although the party has continually lost votes and in the last election, 1970, drew only 10 percent of the voters. It is the best organized party, and has a larger percentage of its voters as dues-paying members than any other party. What is more significant in our context, however, is the fact that its youth and student organizations are strong, and sponsor an impressive array of educational and political activities. It is also the only youth organization which stands (it would appear) *to the Right* of its parent organization.

What may be even more significant is that — in spite of the fact that the radical Left gets the newspaper headlines — most active political group at the universities are the Conservative party's student groups. At the four main universities the communists and socialists have been in control only 116 days at Lund and one year at Uppsala. Otherwise these organizations representing 90,000 students have been led by conservative dominated bourgeois-party coalitions. Today the largest student organization is the conservative one. What would appear an even clearer sign of future direction was revealed during the "mock-elections" in 1970 during which 384,500 students indicated their political preferences. The socialists won only 36.5 percent of the youth vote, whereas in the general elections they gained 45.3 percent. Had the youth vote been the decisive one the socialists-communists would have lost with 44.9 percent against the three non-socialist parties, whereas they won the 1970 elections by a combined 50.5 percent of the votes. And representatives of the conservative trend among the young are already to be found in the Parliament the youngest MP in Sweden's history, at twenty-six, is an eloquent defender of conservative ideals and ideas.

Democratic Alliance

A relatively new, political activist organization is Democratic Alliance whose activities resemble very much the international aspects of Young Americans for Freedom. It was organized in 1967 by fifteen people in order to engage in the battle against "communism, nazism, fascism, and racism." Today one evidence of its success is that the group has about 3,000 members, and chapters in all of Sweden's major cities. It has even an international influence and Democratic Alliance groups are to be found in Sweden's neighbors, Denmark, Norway, Finland, and even in England, where they have forty MPs as sponsors.

The activities of the Alliance are manifold, and are evidences of the devotion of its young members, often drawn from high-school and university students, and coming not infrequently from wealthy homes. They sponsor study circles, invite speakers, arrange public meetings, and hold massive demonstrations against communism with between 500 and 1,500 participants. They sell a semi-official newspaper called *Argument for Freedom and Justice*, they have sold more than 100,000 lapel-pins, a fourth of which picture the American and Swedish flags crossed with a clasped hand in friendship shown underneath. (At a recent demonstration the author was photographed, close up, no less than ten times by Communists simply for wearing that pin.) Struggling against acts of violence by Maoist thugs, individual Alliance members have been beaten up, their offices ransacked, their meetings interferred with, and at a recent anti-totalitarian demonstration in Goteborg it took 200 police to protect them from the Communist "counter-demonstrators." The Democratic Alliance is carrying on an excellent job of political education and activism against formidable odds — often with little help from their elders in the form of moral or financial support. They represent a new and hopeful generation in Sweden today.

Forum for Conservative Ideas

If Democratic Alliance resembles the political activities of Young Americans for Freedom, the Forum for Conservative

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Ideas (Konservativt Ideforum) could be said to reflect the aims and form of the Intercollegiate Studies Institute (until 1966 known as Intercollegiate Society of Individualists). As its American prototype, the Forum is neither a partisan, nor a directly political group, but is educative in character. Political and philosophical ideas are studied and discussed from Burke to Kirk. When news of and literture about the American conservative movement of the 1950s finally reached Sweden in the 1960s, a nucleus of university students began to entertain ideas of organizing a non-partisan study group along ISI lines.

Although the group is numerically small (it has about 200 members in five university towns), its impact has been far beyond its numbers. Good publicity has attended the lectures, seminars, and debates which they have sponsored. A distinguished roster of sponsors lend weight to the organizations intellectual image. Their activities have resulted in a series of articles in one of Sweden's best daily newspapers under the title "Is Conservatism Possible?" which has later been published in book form *(Kampande Konservatism)*. Even more significant was the publication by the group's two cofounders of *Amerikansk Nykonservatism* (American Neo-Conservatism) which is an excellently written book about the rebirth in the 1950s of conservative ideas and debate in the United States. The book has received much — and mostly favorable — attention and has presented a picture of the United States and of American students seldom seen in Sweden. As the Forum for Conservative Ideas slowly grows, and its impact becomes more widespread there is no doubt but that it will add its intellectual strength to the party-political work of the Young Conservatives and the political activism of Democratic Alliance, for the good of Sweden and a healthier political climate there.

To be sure, many obstacles remain before the leftward direction of Sweden's political life can be arrested and changed to a right trend. For one thing the relationship between the three groups mentioned is not good. They will not feel comfortable having been mentioned together in this article. They have not as yet the spirit of cooperation which, in the main, exists between YR, ISI, and YAF in the United States, and the Alliance and the Forum often lack funds.

But for the first time this author has some hope that Sweden might be turning in the right direction. The change in Sweden's politics is not going to come from the large number of pensioners who are still operating with the "depression-years syndrome." Nor is a political change going to come from the middle-aged parents who have been imbued with the postwar materialism, who are afraid of ideas and ideals, and cynical about their application in Sweden's political life today.

The change can only come from the young Swedes as represented by the hard-working, often idealistic youth in the groups mentioned. Out of adversity has grown hope, from repression of political variability has grown a new resiliance. It is inspiring to be with and to talk with these young people who are performing an admirable task against such odds. This author has written many sad accounts about Sweden — even in this pages of this jolly journal — but for the first time there appear glimpses of hope for Sweden. After having grown up entirely under an increasingly powerful and imperious socialist regime, it is good to know that many young people in Sweden today have the belief that their actions can bring about a change in the political direction of their nation. And it is only through them that such a change will ever be accomplished in Sweden.



A New Batch of Boodlers!

(WASHINGTON) — As you read this you should realize that you know something that I didn't know when I wrote it. You know what happened on November 7th while I can only guess.

Now as you can no doubt imagine, this puts a political writer at a bit of a disadvantage. Indeed as I sat down to write this column, I was forced to begin by cursing the inconsistent, shortsighted publishing types who, for reasons of their own, set pre-election deadlines for a post election issue, which must of necessity include commentary on the election.

But such are the handicaps under which we were forced to labor. I should make no further mention of them save to warn our readers of their existence; suffice it to say that as I write this, I don't really know how many votes separated Richard Nixon and George McGovern on November 7, or even if the President got the "sweeping mandate" he has dreamed of so long. Nor do I know how many Republican senators were elected either on their own or by hanging on to the President's coattails and I have not the faintest idea whether the Republican party came close to taking over the House of Representatives. I do know that the Republicans should have won several Senate seats, and if they didn't I think we can conclude either that the President's coattails were even shorter than some observers predicted them to be or that someone, somewhere, messed up things pretty badly.

If all went well, Richard Nixon should have received at least 57 percent of the popular vote and two-thirds of the electoral vote. In addition, Republicans should have won Senate seats in Rhode Island, New Mexico, North Carolina, Kentucky, Texas, Idaho, and New Hampshire. They should either be in control of the Senate or angling for Senator Harry Byrd's support so that they can take control in January. They should have at least picked up twenty-five House seats, not enough to give them control of the House, but certainly enough to brag about. If these things all happen on November 7, the President and his people accomplished the possible. If the President got more than 57 percent of the vote or if the Republicans did substantially better than expected in other races, White House strategists can take credit for a major victory. If he did worse than this, however, and had no coattails, they will have to thank the stars that this year they had George McGovern to kick around.

Actually, regardless of the outcome, you can assume that with the election over everyone in Washington is wondering just what Richard Nixon intends to do with the presidency for four more years. Some seem to feel he will be "looking for a place in history," while others see him as a free man at last able to act on the basis of what he believes is right rather than on the suspicion of what might be most expedient. There are those who feel that the second Nixon Administration will be even more liberal than the first. They see a push for FAP like solutions to our domestic ills and more government involvement in the lives of individual Americans. Others don't think the President will follow this course at all. They see him as basically conservative and suspect that he will take a great personal interest in domestic affairs in the next four years, and they insist if he does we will witness a significant rightward shift in U.S. domestic policy. Most observers, however, suspect the next four years will be remarkably like those that we have weathered. They suspect that we will see many more decisions made on an ad hoc basis by White House staffers and anonymous bureaucratic operatives. This doesn't necessarily mean that the policies adopted during the next four years will be those of the first four, but it does seem to me that they will be developed in similar ways. Those who hold this opinion believe either that the President is not ideologically motivated or that his ideological proclivities don't always directly affect the day to day decisions that result in the development of public policy.

One thing, however, is certain. The political landscape has been altered and altered significantly as a result of the November 7 election and the campaign

(continued on page 19)

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Correspondence

To the Editor:

I write to offer serious objection to the tone and content of your lead editorial, "Hard Times for Endangered Species," in the May issue. Its principle fault, amply illustrated by the most curius convulsions of reasoning, is the positing of a flamboyantly false dilemma: the contention that a desire to preserve from extinction our endangered coinhabitants of the planet requires the rejection of valid human claims and interests. This strange thesis is supported by such gems of logic as the following: "... these curious persons who adore the orangutan often end up abominating their own country and civilization." Quite aside from the fact that this premise is a reckless **post hoc** assertion, it is empirically unsupportable. I would assume, not without some justification, that those, like Mr. Tyrrell, who flippantly state that "I shall be no more disconsolate when the last monkey-eating eagle assumes room temperature than when the last Austrian Archduke croaks" display an omnibus insensitivity to natural phenomena that most certainly includes a lack of a delicate regard for the human condition. One suspects that individuals such as Mr. Tyrrell, beyond an obvious fascination for somewhat crude provocative rhetoric, are simply aesthetically and possibly ethically obtuse.

Certainly we have been treated, from time to time, with colorful examples of anthropocentric **hubris**, of promethean bravado, but few compare in terms of utter brashness with Mr. Tyrrell's exuberant essay. Mr. Tyrrell has seen fit, in an almost sophomoric pique, to denounce what D.H. Lawrence once called "cosmic piety." Piety, you may recall, originally meant reverence for one's origins. Perhaps Mr. Tyrrell is an unreconstructed devotee of Bishop Wilberforce, unwilling to accept his naturalistic genesis, but if this be the case, his problem does not consist alone in his scientific naivete, but what can only be described as a rather typical, alas, case of alienation from the taproots of human nature. No reasonable observer can deny that man, along with other mammals, is a predator, but the honest predation of the natural order involves both a survival requirement and what I would judge to be a melancholy acceptance of the necessity of predation. Mr. Tyrrell, on the other hand, liberated from his mammalian ancestry, glories in the predacious capabilities of his species, its presumed imperturbability to the face of its devastations. What underlies Mr. Tyrrell's volatile invocation of hominoid independence is **revenge**, the not too covert urge to inflict punishment on the realm of nature as a target for anxiety, frustration, and to erase the offensive imperiousness of man's fellow creatures.

That these motivations, in the public eye, can be connected to some even exotic variety of conservatism is much to be lamented. Mr. Tyrrell is a not untypical illustration of a tendency in contemporary conservatism to view conservation as the preservation of those facets of immediate life thought to be subjectively gratifying. Of course I am distressed that Mr. Tyrrell does not react as others do to the beauty and tragedy of nature, but I can no more compel him to so react than I can coerce others to enjoy Brahms or the vocal art of Birgit Nillson, but, too, such lack of responsiveness is, **per se**, no justification for the closing of concert halls and opera houses or, for that matter, the continued destruction of endangered species. To place art or nature or ethical values upon some scale of subjective appetite is to reduce society to the level of the stock exchange.

Sincerely,
Donald Atwell Zoll
Professor
Arizona State University

Tyrrell Replies:

All those homely strictures about not driving automobiles while under the influence can also be applied to the use of a typewriter.

R. Emmett Tyrrell, Jr.

To the Editor:

Your superb editorial on McGovern could hardly have been improved upon by the great H.L. Mencken whose absence from the scene I keep lamenting more all the time. Not since Mencken on Wilson's academic flatulence, on Harding's "Gamalielese," on more appropriately here the inane populism of William Jennings Bryan have I read anything more splendidly in the Mencken tradition than your assessment of the Clod Populist, McGovern. Right on! I also liked the pieces by Paul Weaver, Roger Rosenblatt, and, not least, your invaluable Bascom C. Slemp. I do urge the study of Mencken on all of you. There are occasional signs that **The Alternative** may yet fill the gap. I hope so.

Robert Nisbet
University of Arizona

To the Editor:

I take no back seat to anyone, Mr. Tyrrell, in deploring George McGovern's candidacy, and I feel that articles such as Alan Reynolds' dispassionate, measured and specific appraisal of "McGovern's Muddled Economics" (page five of your October issue) are most valuable in promoting our common cause.

On the contrary, however, I feel that your editorial entitled "Clod Populism's Man of Change" (page three of your October issue) seriously damages that cause. In my opinion it is so pompous and verbose and passionately and sneeringly belittling as to approach demagoguery in its worst form. It's an insult to intelligent readers who like to read or hear the facts, and then render their own pertinent judgments.

Your publication obviously purports to attract such readers, so there would seem to be no excuse for the kind of diatribe that makes up this editorial.

Your fine and worthwhile publication usually makes good use of light whimsy and humor to make its points. But this particular editorial, I feel, descends to the depths of murky thinking and unnecessary mud-slinging.

It does a disservice to the cause we both espouse.

Sincerely,
Howard A. Gardner
Chicago, Illinois

Establishmentarians:

Gads! Conservatives with a touch of grace and wit!

Keep it up. You are needed. Bill Buckley can't go on intimidating Gore Vidal forever.

Cordially,
Ron K. Javers
Editorial Page Editor
Philadelphia Daily News

To the Editor:

As a regular reader of your magazine I was greatly dismayed to learn that you do not publish during the summer months. But let me assure you the wait was well worthwhile (no alliteration intended). Each month the entire office rollicks to the "Continuing Crisis," "Current Wisdom" and other features. Your serious articles often spark lengthy debate. Keep up the good work.

Please forgive me for not signing my name, but I am a staff member in the office of a United States senator and do not wish to see the boss' name in your "Letters to Plunkitt" column.

Name Withheld
Washington

To the Editor:

Jacqueline R. Kasun's "A Rhineland Fantasy" (October) is, of course, not at all about what might have happened if the U.S. had responded with force in the Rhineland in the 1930s; it was about what might have happened if the U.S. had **not** intervened with force in Vietnam in the 1960s. The clear implication is that if we hadn't decided to fight the Communists in the jungles of Vietnam in 1965, we'd be fighting them in the jungles of Central Park in 1972; or, even worse, our inaction would have caused World War III, so that no one would be fighting anybody. This argument rests on at least one of two faulty premises: one, that Ho Chi Minh was really Adolph Hitler, or a reasonable facsimile thereof; or two, that there exists a monolithic entity called **Communism**, that, like Hitler's Nazism, has a definite and well-coordinated plan to dominate the world by military means. Both these premises are false. Ho Chi Minh's main interest was Vietnam's independence; to that end, he allied himself with Communists. And I had thought that the events of the past few years, most notably the Sino-Soviet conflict, had laid to rest any lingering notions of a "worldwide Communist conspiracy." (I guess I was wrong.)

I think that the people who got us into Vietnam had been so scarred (sic) understandably by World War II that they were determined not to repeat the mistakes that led to it. Thus, our involvement in Vietnam was based on the belief that we were "keeping the world safe for democracy" (a thoroughly commendable objective, obviously).

The record of our involvement in Vietnam is sad enough, but the tragedy is compounded if we continue, as Ms. Kasun does, to cling to the false notions that got us there in the first place.

Sincerely,
David Finkelman
Santa Clara, Ca.

Kasun Replies:

Mr. Finkelman has refuted a number of arguments which were not in my article, which had as one of its main points the observation that to the extent a limited war achieves its objectives it must itself appear to have been unnecessary. It does not appear that Mr. Finkelman has weakened this thesis.

The view expressed by Mr. Finkelman that the United States' action in Vietnam is merely frustrating the legitimate desires of a small country for independence is not widely shared outside of the American anti-war movement. For example, at my campus this spring a leading Marxist, Herbert Marcuse, stated "The domino theory is correct" and continued by saying that as soon as the United States and its allies have been defeated in Vietnam the world "liberation" movement can redouble its momentum. The North Vietnamese effort to subdue the rest of Indochina is, of course, generously supported by the Soviet Union and PR China, in spite of their split, as well as other countries in the communist world which Mr. Finkelman implies does not really exist.

Jacqueline Kasun
U.C. San Diego

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SLEMP

(continued from page 17)

that preceded it. During the campaign the President locked himself into certain positions, made a few promises, and ruled out certain courses of action. For example, he is on the record with the promise to veto legislation that could force taxes up such as the tax quota highering policy pushed during his first term by HEW and Office of Education officials. He may also deal with a different and possibly more independent Republican party, and with a new Congress that could be quite different from the one he has dealt with during the last four years. Therefore, the next few months should prove most interesting.

In the Senate, Hugh Scott will be working to line up the support he will need to hang on to the leadership position he almost lost to Tennessee's Howard Baker two years ago. He and his friends tried to cover all the bases during the campaign by putting money into most close races so that he would at least get a hearing from the new members. But a hearing may be all that he will get. He barely beat Baker two years ago and several of those who supported him then will not be returning in January. In addition, the men who will be taking those seats and some of the new people who should have been elected on November 7 will give the Republican party and the Senate a considerably more conservative cast. No one knows who will oppose Scott this time, but Colorado's Gordon Allott has been prominently mentioned and Baker himself might be interested in another run at it. If either runs and wins, the President will face a decidedly different situation in dealing with the Senate during the next session.

These factors continue to make this a time of some uncertainty in Washington. White House staff people are maneuvering and moving around not knowing how things are going to turn out. The die, however, will be cast by the beginning of February and we should then know which direction the President will be taking during at least the next year or so.

Book Review:

Eliot and His Age

by Russell Kirk

Random House, $12.50

Russell Kirk first met T.S. Eliot in Edinburgh in 1953. At the time, Kirk was attempting to persuade Eliot's publishing firm, Faber & Faber, to publish his *magnum opus*, *The Conservative Mind*. Additionally, he was working on a critique for *The Month* of Eliot's latest play, "The Confidential Clerk," which the poet would warmly greet.

Soon, they were to become fast friends and regular correspondents. When Kirk visited in London, the two men would often lunch at the Garrick or Author's Club. "He was thirty years older than I," remembers Kirk, "but we had read the same books, knew the same places, were almost as one in literary preferences and social convictions and had several old friends in common" (such as Wyndham Lewis and John Betjeman). Such were the ingredients of friendship which developed into a strong, intimate bond between these two defenders of the "permanent things."

Kirk even suggested to Eliot that he would like someday to write a book, entitled *The Age of Eliot*. This book would have encompassed a study of the poet's life, along with the major literary and intellectual figures of his time, commencing at the First World War. An ambitious work, it was perhaps more than Kirk was capable of tackling at the time. With the surprising success of *The Conservative Mind* and his new duties of "speechifying" and defending the dogma his new fame brought him, the book was put aside. Twenty years passed before Kirk was able to publish a major work on Eliot and then, in spite of his ambitious plans, the work was more centered upon Eliot and his work rather than on the more far-ranging topic of his age.

Kirk, though, never doubted that the original title of his book accurately described the all-pervasive influence that

RUSSELL KIRK

Eliot had upon letters during the first half of this century. "In humane letters," Kirk states plainly, "ours has been the Age of Eliot, as once there was an Age of Dryden, and an Age of Johnson." Whatever truth that such labels for literary periods may contain, this one appears to me to be less true for this age than most others. Our age, especially *apres la fin de siecle*, is hallmarked as one of extreme cultural and intellectual heterogeneity. No single man nor doctrine can shore the fragments against the ruins, to paraphrase a line from *The Waste Land*. Eliot's age, after all, contained such diverse significant figures as D.H. Lawrence, e.e. cummings, Ernest Hemingway, Upton Sinclair, F. Scott Fitzgerald; all men who had no truck with Eliot's "permanent things" and who were generally mystified by or disinterested in Eliot as an artist or social critic. And, who today among the poets, save Robert Lowell, carries on Eliot's literary traditions? At most universities Eliot is rarely taught, and remembered by a few students only as some fuddy-duddy dead poet whose poems they had to struggle with in freshman English.

As one of the foremost poets and literary critics of his time, Eliot's reputation was indeed considerable and remains so today. Much literature throughout Eliot's life and since has dwelt upon his impact on contemporary literature. If he is remembered at all, it is as a poet and critic.

By contrast, however, few have considered Eliot's perceptive and imaginative social criticism. On that aspect of Eliot's work, scholars seemed to fall silent. G.H. Bantock's little book, *T.S. Eliot and Education* (1970), stood until recently as one of the few exceptions.

Fortunately, Kirk manages to fill much of this gap in analysis and criticism in his book. "T.S. Eliot was the principle champion of moral imagination in the twentieth century," writes Kirk. Certainly, then, for this generation, Kirk has become one of the chief defenders of Eliot's social principles.

To discover the clue to the basis of Eliot's social thought, we must turn to Edmund Burke's idea of "moral imagination." Here, too, lies also the true meaning of conservatism. There is much argument afoot today about the poverty of labels such as "liberal" and "conservative" that would not take place if it were understood that "moral imagination" is the principle which most distinguishes the conservative from the liberal, libertarian, or radical.

"Moral imagination" is the "power of ethical perception which strides beyond the barriers of private experience and events of the moment...especially...the higher form of this power exercised in poetry and arts." As with Plato, Virgil, and Dante, this power aspires to the apprehending of the right order in the soul and in the commonwealth.

Eliot's task throughout his life was to struggle "for the recovery of order...." In the last number of *The Criterion*, a small literary journal which Eliot edited during the inter-war period, Eliot wrote that at the basis of every

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political philosophy there must be right religious principles. "For myself," he wrote, "a right political philosophy came more and more to imply a right theology—and right economics to depend upon right ethics...." Elsewhere, he observed, "As political philosophy derives its sanction from ethics and ethics from the truth of religion; it is only by returning to the eternal source of truth that we can hope for any social organization which will not, to its ultimate destruction ignore some essential aspects of liberty."

Like Sir Walter Scott, Eliot did not "live and die in the heresy that the world is ruled by little pamphlets and speeches," nor by the schemes of social engineers or planners. Rather, if political philosophy is to provide direction to the decent, just, enduring social order, then man must learn to abide by the "permanent things," — those norms of being, the endurable moral truths that have been held by all civilized men because "all other grounds," as Russell Kirk has written, "are quicksand." The "permanent things" are what C.S. Lewis has called in his book, *The Abolition of Man*, "The Way" or the *Tao*, and have been variously called throughout intellectual history Natural Law, Traditional Morality, the First Principles of Reason, or the First Platitudes. They are our first source for all value judgments. Tinkering with the political system to improve upon it held little interest for Eliot; rather he believed as did Samuel Johnson that if men's morality is tolerably strong, then almost any political system will work.


As the SHIPS come in they are liable to bring
CHOLERA
Which attacks people suddenly and without
WARNING
In such cases no medicine is equal to
PERRY DAVIS' PAIN KILLER
In INDIA where the CHOLERA is so terrible the natives
WORSHIP PERRY DAVIS' PAIN-KILLER and call it the MEDICINE of the GODS, because it is so wonderful in its cures ... It should be in every house—It is invaluable for CHOLERA MORBUS Diarrhoea Dysentery and all BOWEL Complaints. Perry Davis & Son, Prop's Providence, R.I.

As a poet, Eliot felt it to be his duty to defend order. The "public order," he wrote, "is intertwined with the order of the soul; therefore the poet cannot ignore it."

With Burke and all the great conservative thinkers, Eliot possessed a deep sense of the continuity of history. Society is a contract, in Burke's eloquent and enduring words, "not only between those who are living, but between those who are living, those who are dead, and those who are to be born." Mankind is wrapped in Burke's "great mysterious incorporation of the human race" and whether it be the affairs of government or art. Eliot understood, as Bantock has written, that true "originality...can exist only in a context, and that context is itself the creation of many past generations." In *Dry Salvages*, Eliot wrote: "I have said before/that the past experience revived in the meaning/is not the experience of one life only/but of many generations...."

As a conservative and traditionalist, Eliot was the converse of the ideologue. His social thought was not built upon formal political theory nor upon any of the popular ideologies of his day, but rather was derived from the experience and pain of life and the inherited wisdom of the Western Civilization. The major ideologues of the time, Freud, Marx, Sorel, Shaw, had little influence on him. Eliot went to the great literary and intellectual figures, such as Saint John of the Cross, Lancelot Andrewes, Samuel Johnson, Burke, Irving Babbitt, to the true defenders of the permanent things, for his political principles.

Throughout his life Eliot detested Whirl, Speed, Mass, and the evils of social boredom, the destruction of community, social continuity, and the environment that the technological society brought. He disliked finances, industrialists, materialism, and the new figure of the mass society, Coriolan, the dictator and savior of a rudderless and confused people. If men now so infatuated with the ephemeral doctrines of the New Left could understand, or even read him, they would find a defender of some of their better ideas. For although he lacked their smug secularism and destructive revolutionary spirit, he spoke long before the likes of Jerry Rubin and Abbie Hoffman were even gleams in the minds of their parents, against the impending disastrous and dehumanizing results of a civilization bent upon ceaseless materialistic change.

Early on in his book, Kirk tells the reader that he intends his work both "to criticize an important body of literature, and to relate that literature to the events and circumstances and prospects in this century." This is not just another Eliot biography, but additionally is the history of a cultural era and a critique of Eliot's major poetic, dramatic, and prose writing.

Kirk takes for granted that the reader is acquainted with Eliot's major works. The book is certainly no substitute for having read Eliot in the original. His analysis assumes that the reader has read Eliot before coming to this book.

Kirk's criticism and interpretation of Eliot's poems, while not being faulty to the point of embarrassment, is not up to Kirk's usual high quality, nor do his efforts equal what has been obtained from the pens of Hugh Kenner, Elizabeth Drew, and Cleanth Brooks. Too often Kirk relies upon the authority of others for his judgments and does not appear to be making original statements of interpretation.

For my part, I prefer the critic who boldly states his judgments and analyses without relying directly upon previous authorities or secondary sources, unless they provide essential information or their criticism has had such influence that it blocks the path to a clear and unprejudiced understanding of the poem — in other words, a case where the critics must also be submitted to criticism.

Kirk appears to be much happier as a critic of Eliot, the dramatist, where the themes and characters seem more suited to his tastes. Here, Kirk performs the welcome service of unravelling some of the more cryptic passages of Eliot to make his plays comprehensible to a public not well versed in the great Christian and classical literature on which Eliot depended.

Best yet, Kirk is at home with Eliot's social and political writings. On these matters, Kirk is close to Eliot in spirit and conviction. He is, in fact, so laudatory in his praise of Eliot's social principles that many critics may well dismiss this book as just another effusive attempt to capture the poet as the hero of the Right. For example, Frank Kemonde in his rather smug review of this book for *The New York Times* argues that Kirk has written nothing more than a right-wing effort to make Eliot a conservative champion of "moral imagination." "Either you are an Eliotian Tory," Mr. Kemonde would have Kirk say, "or a barbarian swilling the wine among the ruins of the great chateaux."

On a different level of political thinking, both Eliot and Kirk possessed a mutual disliking for Sir Winston Churchill and the kind of statesmanship he represented for England. Kirk, though, never clearly explains this adversion to the Conservative Prime Minister nor why conservatives should join him in this feeling. I have always been perplexed by Kirk's distaste for Churchill and never understood the reasons behind it — other than once he observed simply that he felt Churchill to be shifty and unprincipled.

Unlike Robert Sencourt and other biographers of Eliot, too steeped in vulgar Freudianism for their own good, Kirk pointedly avoids any mention of Eliot's sex life. Nor does he commit what Hugh Kenner has called the Genetic Fallacy of looking for meaning in Eliot's poems by noting the women he frequented. Kirk observes only that lifelong Eliot "was severe in the encounter of the sexes." Like Eliot, Kirk maintains that a poet's own emotions are irrelevant or trivial; what matters is

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the poet's touching on universal emotions. While Shelley's romantic egotism may have made a study of his life a necessity; the classical objectivity of Eliot reduces his personal experience to incidental interest. As to the Freudian critics who find the sexual asceticism of *The Waste Land*, and *The Cocktail Party* as evidence of an abnormal man, Kirk replies that a shy man does not necessarily have to be neurotic.

But an argument which has garnered such extreme interest will not be settled by that. It is a well-known fact that Eliot had a tragically unhappy first marriage with Vivienne. What effects could the torments of these early years have had upon Eliot? The question has been asked frequently, and the answer seldom, if ever, satisfactory. At one point, Kirk suggests that it made little difference in his writings. Eliot would have "lamented over the bent world" even if he had married the Hyacinth Girl. "Others, your servant among them," Kirk concludes, "have kept their metaphysics warm even in the company of Cupid and Campaspe." But, this sentence contributes no useful information. It tells us simply that Kirk has a warm and loving family life (which all friends of Kirk know to be true) and that the scholar may be competent at his work and have a loving family as well, which seems to be too obvious a point to have been made. The sentence conveys no meaning, no information, and appears embarrassingly maudlin at that.

Near the conclusion of the book, Kirk touches upon this subject once more. More convincingly, he argues that if Eliot had chosen a loving and understanding wife early, his "literary and social principles would have been the same." But, he questions whether Eliot would have created *The Waste Land*, *Murder in the Cathedral*, *Four Quartets*, and *The Cocktail Party*. If happily married, his mind would have been as strong, he now suggests, but his "'feelings' provided the creative impulse, and his feelings would have been less intense, in brighter circumstances."

In spite of my expressed misgivings with some of the judgments made in the book, I feel that as a whole Kirk has made a major contribution to the literature on Eliot, worthy of the attention of every scholar professing to understand the essence of Eliot's social and literary principles. But more importantly, it is also a book for conservatives who wish to discover the roots of imaginative conservative thinking.

As always, Kirk has maintained a highly readable style throughout this book which I find reminiscent of a variety of writers: Boswell, Johnson, Dickens, Henry Adams, G.K. Chesterton, and because of their obvious philosphical similarities, Eliot (although, I believe his prose to be plainer and therefore more enjoyable to read than the poet's). He has, no doubt, developed one of the most pleasurable prose styles in the English language to read, primarily because of his close attention to these writers throughout his life.

Written by one who knew and loved Eliot, *Eliot and His Age* cannot be closed without the reader feeling, in agreement with the author, that although others might have known Eliot better, Kirk has not "failed to apprehend his character."

W. Wesley MacDonald

Book Review:

The Impudent Snobs

by John R. Coyne, Jr.
Arlington House, $8.95

"I think I'm properly considered a part of the center. Labels are very difficult. I made some judgments in the course of my political career...which have been characterized as flaming liberal. I don't think they were; I think they were sensible. I think some of the things I'm saying now that are compatible with the views of the people who consider themselves very conservative are still sensible."

—Vice President Agnew, 1970
on *Firing Line*.

A story, privately told by Henry Kissinger, runs as follows. Shortly after the 1968 Republican convention, candidate Richard Nixon gave Henry Kissinger the assignment of "educating" Spiro Agnew. National security affairs, congressional relations and similar areas of topical importance to the technically complete vice president would be "spoon fed" to Mr. Agnew by Hollywood's most famous professor. Early in the semester, in late August, Professor Kissinger declared his pupil to be profoundly unprepared for the course work because of previous inexperience with the curriculum. A month after the election, after four months of study, Kissinger revised his earlier criticism thus: The Vice President is the fastest learner I have ever met.

While most men formally prepare themselves for the vice presidency before coming to Washington, Mr. Agnew started reading only *after* his arrival. And while most vice presidents bide their time covertly running for president and flirting with the labor and press aristocracies, Vice President Agnew has concentrated on perfecting his knowledge of statecraft and mastering the native languages of Washington, D.C. He is fast becoming one of the most well read of America's public servants.

Almost as many people misunderstand John Coyne's excellent book on the Vice President as join Henry Kissinger in wrongly pegging the Vice President. As Coyne explains in a letter to *National Review*, June 9th, correcting an uncharacteristically shoddy review of Coyne's book by Neal Freeman, *The Impudent Snobs* is not purported to be a biography of the Vice President — incognito or otherwise. It deals with Spiro Agnew's ninety-four most important speeches (the texts of which are included in an appendix) and the various reactions to them (reported by Coyne in a 171 page introduction). For all the charges of rhetorical genocide enthusiastically made by media types against these speeches (which Eric Hoffer has described as the only consistently thoughtful commentaries proffered by a living American politician), Coyne offers an impressive empirical rebuttal and more. Conjunctive analysis uniting his introduction provides a portrait of the man ritualistic liberals and even some conservatives relegate to "All in the Family" status.

In April, 1968, Governor Agnew reprimanded a group of Black community leaders by reminding them that it is wrong to throw bombs at innocent civilians. The press has never forgiven him. On Bill Buckley's *Firing Line*, a few years ago, the Vice President confessed that he did not belong to the Philadelphia Society, and some young conservative colleagues of mine have privately burped "Betrayal" ever since. At a time when Ph.D candidates in economics actually receive their union cards without ever having *heard* of Von Mises, even Milton Friedman is supporting the election of the New Keynesian, while the Vice President has expressed "grave misgivings" over FAP and a Generation of Deficits — misgivings which he is unable to articulate publicly because of his office. Still, many libertarians of various creeds either sneer at the Agnew name or in some cases, they are supporting the Free Enterprise ticket of McGovern (e.g.,The Pennsylvania leaders of the late S.I.L. are tanstaafling it at McGovern headquarters). Orthodox Randist friends of mine bow to Saint Ayn's endorsement of Nixon, but they express to me their "rational" contempt for a vice president who does not include the Virtue of Selfishness in his speeches.

Though one may read all of the available biographies of Agnew, *only* in Coyne's book can one put the choo-choo train of lifeless statistics concerning where, why, and how the Vice President was born into true perspective, thus allowing a glimpse of the man President Nixon might never let us see. (After Vice President Agnew appeared on "The David Frost Show" in 1969, the White House was besieged by letters from viewers who professed astonishment over what they called Agnew's "humane and intelligent" nature which, though known to Agnew, was unknown to viewers accustomed to seeing an insensitive vice president eating students for breakfast. The President, upon learning of the broadcast in which the Vice President did not feign fire-eater, was greatly disturbed. He must never be allowed to get onto something like that Frost Show again, snapped the President "He must be my hammer.")

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Agnew, better than Nixon or any other political figure, is the authentic product of and spokesman for the Silent Majority, the productive middle of our country without which our nation might be little bigger than Iceland and as productive as India during the cow season. He is not a card carrying conservative or a liberal and has never pretended to be. Like the majority of Americans, he does not operate as an ideological agent. Those who are closest to him, however, note a dominant and growing conservatism in his nature, one which reflects the waxing social conservatism in the American population.

It is important to understand that this so-called conservatism of the Vice President, one which expresses itself two out of three times politically (e.g., pro-Nixon on Federal Health Insurance, but anti-FAP and anti-China), is fundamentally social. That is, it is in correlation with sentiments by the Silent Majority, emphasis on individual reliance and initiative, the right to privacy (i.e., as challenged by compulsory busing, abortion, the drug culture, Zero Population Growth, Skinnerites, etc.), patriotism, the role of religion, societal order, and the preservation of more than a mere vestige of our republican political system is important to most Americans, and it is important to Agnew. Not because he read it in *National Review*! Not because a president asked him to perform in return for political gifts! But because these values have become a part of him. Unlike young Richard Nixon, young Tec Agnew had no intention of being president of the United States. His adventures as a young man are more akin to the typical stories of hard working, "regular," growing Americans than the President's strictly-confined, Quaker upbringing of self-imposed isolation from his adolescent peers. This is not to cast judgment on either, but only to mark the difference in the two so that we may compensate for differences in the two men, respectively.

Agnew is Middle America's Man in Washington, a Middle America vividly drawn by Coyne's recognition of its most prominent non-members: Professor Charles Reich (*The Greening of America*), totally "cloistered in the academy," composing uninformed sappy books so that he may win membership in The Kids, Daniel Ellsberg, the agent of pure Emotion in search of his personal Calvary, carrying his wooden cross and floodlights up the steep stage en route to the nearest street corner to set up shop. Robert MacNamara, the Agent of Pure Intellect, the Fleshy Computer who, in the tradition of the true Rationalist, is only capable of making politics as the crow flies. The garden variety liberal professor of American literature, "who can't write a novel and, therefore, hates Ernest Hemingway," and who can't love his country and, therefore, hates Spiro Agnew. And the elitism of media men who hold disdain for those who cannot eat wine-soaked luncheons at *San Soucis*, the Gary Wills variety of disdain of those who find it offensive that the American workingman simply can't seem to stay in the place they would like to assign him." Explains Coyne, "When my first book appeared, I remember that Gary Wills, in a killer review, called me a 'hard-hat with a degree.' I found this phrase, and the attitude which informed it, particularly offensive, for I was proud of the fact that I came from a working-class family, that I had also been a hard-hat, and that I managed to earn a couple of degrees. This would not have been possible in most of the countries in Europe, for instance, or at least not nearly as easy. But the reaction wasn't so much personal. The important thing in Wills' statement seemed to me to be the underlying assumption that somehow it was wrong for a hard-hat to earn a college degree." (p. 129)

But Gary Wills, like most elitists, is not of this world. He believes that he is a reincarnation of Dr. Samuel Johnson, his professed hero, living in the world he imagines Dr. Johnson living in, the world of Miniver Cheevy, the world of Kurt Vonnegut's Tralfamadore. However, millions of Americans—most of them, in fact, live in a place called the real world. And they have a hero too. And his name is Agnew.

Ronald F. Docksai

Book Review:

Things to Come

by Herman Kahn and B. Bruce-Biggs
Macmillan Co., $6.95

B. Bruce-Biggs, a lecturer at the Hudson Institute, and Herman Kahn, Director and lecturer at the Institute, have produced a book which continues in the strain of the Kahn tradition. Kahn is widely recognized as a leading thinker in the field of politico-military strategy, and as a major figure in the "science of futurology." His controversial study, *On Thermonuclear War*, gave physics and mathematics a new relevancy for the political and policy scientist, when Kahn developed deterrence and counter-deterrence strategy to its ultimate, rational and logical end. In a later book, *Thinking About The Unthinkable. The Year 2000*, Kahn's scenarios once again aroused debate among the academic and professional community, both in terms of efficacy, methodology, and application. While the merits and weaknesses of Kahn's arguments found no concensus, no one could deny their heuristic value. The same cannot be said for this latest book.

Things To Come offers little new material if a reader is familiar with the heretofore mentioned books and *The Emerging Japanese Superstate*. Kahn offers an excellent example in how a writer can soak his material for all its worth; his first *magnum opus* produced a furor, his latest will not even cause a tremor.

Things To Come is a synthesis of Kahn's earlier writings. He covers the long term multifold trend of western culture, based on Pitrim Sorokin's terminology (although not his concepts), i.e. the emergence of a sensate culture. From this the authors proceed into various scenarios, and they offer a case study in methodology in a chapter on Japan; they cover the psycho-sociological, politico-economic, philosophical, and technological development, drawing conclusions and offering projections. (All of which Kahn has done before.) But the areas the authors cover in such brief space is too voluminous to get the attention deserved. The discussion and organization resembles a glob of silly putty, with little coherence. Kahn's books were never meant for the casual reader, and this one is no exception. It also does the author(s) a disservice, since its appeal could only be for a reader seeking an introduction to Kahn. However, a lack of references undermines even this purpose.

In their conclusion, the authors say that man has lost his faith in material progress; this is hardly a startling revelation. Pundits covering the entire philosophical spectrum have drawn upon the same premise, while drawing radically different conclusions. The defrocked priest and Marcusian philosopher, Ivan Illich, has argued that present society resembles Ambrosia, a picture of society with declining hopes and rising expectations, which expected the engineer to increase its satisfaction while reducing its wants; an impossible task, man being what he is. The rise of neo-classical conservatism grew out of similar convictions, i.e., Leo Strauss has argued that widespread nihilism in Western Civilization was the inevitable nemesis of liberalism and philosophical "Conventionalism." But here the similarity ends. Whereas e.g., Illich called for the birth of a new epimethean man, Strauss called for the reawakening of classical values, the belief in natural right.

Kahn and Bruce-Biggs believe that the future can and should be altered normatively, by "varying man." They argue that much has already been attained; since World War II they identify a growing awareness of global community, that the globe is recognizing the need for a *res communis omnium*. Their optimism is, to say the least, debatable. Their perception of the future, however, is based on the premise that "modern man" (they include themselves) share the "contemporary views of scientific 'laws' " and they believe that the future will be eclectic and syncretic. Implicit in this philosophical interpretation seems to be a revival of Positivism, i.e., the birth of a new man who no longer has the need for metaphysics and theology.

Kahn is primarily a scientist and not a philosopher, and he overshadows Bruce-Biggs, the historian. Although the book expresses a concern for values, the tools of the scientist cannot hope to approach grasping, and certainly not answering,

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the so-called "big questions" which have stymied philosophers through the ages. *Things To Come* is logical enough and perhaps too scientific; it suggests the fallacy of Malthusian economics by taking scenarios to a *punktum ad absurdum* and by justifying these scenarios on the *argumentum ad ignoratium*. As such, logic goes beyond the point of relevance.

Albert Einstein was once asked if he believed that everything could be expressed scientifically. He replied that it could, but that it would make no sense: "It would be a description without meaning, as if you described a Beethoven symphony as variations of wave pressure." *Things To Come* leaves me with the same feeling; there is an awful lot of wave pressure, but none of the harmony and sensitivity of a Bachian fugue.

Herman Kahn's books are rarely dull, but his latest publication is a disappointment; it does neither the author(s), nor the reader justice.

Peter Hughes

Movie Review:

Man vs. Nature; Man vs. Maleness

"It's clever, but is it art?" Kipling asked, as must all film critics almost each time we see a noteworthy film. Film is the people's art; the books read each year, except by students pressured to do so, and the plays gone to and contemplated, don't add up to much in numbers, compared to the movies seen, discussed and argued. So much of film, today and for decades past, is quickly forgettable trash, "art" only in the sense, a mile wide and an inch deep, in which anything acted, or filmed, or sculpted, drawn, painted, sung, played, warbled becomes "art." But some movies approach art, in Dryden's sense of art as nature's handmaid, and others at least satisfy Wilde's pithy aside: "Art never expresses anything but itself."

There's much of art in *Deliverance* — art according to both Dryden's and Wilde's definitions — and much cleverness too. Based on James Dickey's gut-stomping novel, written for the screen by him, and directed by John Boorman, *Deliverance* makes a canoe-trip into the wilderness undertaken by four Atlantans into a thrilling vision of man's struggle with Nature and himself; it is perhaps a tale too heavily larded with symbolism of the sort with which those of us who've undergone deep college lit. courses are only too familiar, and unfortunately it's being reviewed again and again in the most elevated metaphorical (and metaphysical) manner. But its essence is an exciting tale excitingly told, a creation of art.

Enough bubbling; on with the story. Led by Lewis (Burt Reynolds), who believes "machines are gonna fail. The system's gonna fail. And then — survival," Ed (Jon Voight), Bobby (Ned Beatty), and Drew (Ronny Cox) set out for a battle with Georgia's dangerous Chattooga River. Their initial contacts with the inbred, hostile, suspicious, moronic, back-country folks, aside from Drew's discovery of a mentally and physically defective mute boy with whom he plays a banjo-guitar duet of surpassing beauty, lead the timid followers to urge Lewis to turn back. To no avail. Lewis needs challenges to confirm his will and strength.

The river is nasty, rapids are everywhere. And the hill-folk are brutal as well as wary. With Lewis and Drew still to arrive on shore the second day, Ed and Bobby are confronted by two men toting guns. They tie Ed to a tree and point a gun at him while one sodomizes fat, squealing Bobby. Just as the other man is about to force Ed to fellate him, Lewis and Drew return. Lewis takes aim and shoots one man in the heart. The other runs away, Bobby recovers what is left of his dignity, and the four adventurers argue over whether to hide the body or take their chances with the law.

Pragmatism wins; Lewis convinces Ed and Bobby that the law in those parts of the country will deal harshly with anyone who has killed one of their own. Drew resists, begs the others to do what's right. From then on, things get worse. The four city men bury the corpse and set out again in their two canoes. At the next major set of rapids, Drew topples out of the canoe, the others are catapulted out of their's, Lewis breaks his leg, and the three survivors wash up on a rock. Lewis is convinved that the escaped rapist has shot Drew, that he's somewhere above them waiting to shoot them all. This situation obliges Ed, the quiet, gentle man who can't bring himself to shoot a doe, to scale the peak and hunt down the mountain man. He does so, wounding himself with his own bow in the process. The scene of Ed's ascent to the mountain top and his confrontation with the man he must kill represents movie-making at its finest; it also confirms Voight's tremendous talents, as his battles both with nature and with his own sense of values take on concrete dimensions. Art geniunely imitates nature.

Eventually the four men make it to a town, there lie about their doings, seek medical care for Lewis and Ed, are mightily distrusted by the sheriff (played by author Dickey), and go home. Drew and the two rapists are dead, left to be covered over by a lake when Progress alters the river and brings "civilization" to the back-country; Bobby wants only to forget; Lewis stands to lose his leg; and Ed, upon whose terrified nightmares the film closes, bears the vivid scars of this struggle for survival and this uncertain deliverance from victimization by the river and other men.

I regret only (and this is an infrequent regret among film critics) that *Deliverance* is not longer. Inevitably much of Dickey's fine book goes by the way. But of 1972 films, only *Cabaret* thus far touches *Deliverance* for excellence. Music, the photography by Vilmos Zsigmond, who did *McCabe and Mrs. Miller*, the bounty and terror of the river, and above all, the acting of everyone concerned, particularly Jon Voight, combine to make a film deserving the description, art.

The connection between *Deliverance* and the second film for discussion here, *Heat*, is not, surely, that of equality of execution. *Deliverance* stands by itself, expressing a towering vision and showcasing uniformly excellent performances. But like *Deliverance*, *Heat* investigates man's self-image, not, as in the first film, vis a vis nature, but in relation to maleness itself. Another item out of Andy Warhol's factory, again (as with *Flesh* and *Trash)* written, photographed, and directed by Paul Morrissey, *Heat* is as unconcerned with Nature as is *Deliverance* with fading Hollywood stars. Both films deal with the mockery that happenstance and other people make of man's image of himself as tough, resilient, and in charge of his fate. In *Deliverance*, Lewis the bold becomes, when wounded, Lewis the whimpering child, as do most males when they are sick or wounded, and without hope. And the homosexual rape is the utter degradation, for men who seem themselves as the dominant sex, those who (symbolically) rape their wives and girl friends, but are not to be done to as they do with. In *Heat*, the male image is the most trite of all: a young, hot, super-stud, played as in most recent Warhol-Morrissey films by Joe Dallesandro, an actor of much greater talent, as each succeeding movie shows, than his obvious appeal as a muscle-beauty-boy would lead one to expect.

Joe is the former kid star now on the skids, to whom women are drawn like bees to honey. To lower his rent, he consents to service the grotesque, porcine landlady of his seedy motel-apartment house. To find contacts in show biz, he lets himself become the kept-boy of Sally Todd (fantastically acted by Sylvia Myles), a fleshy, sun-parched, bleached, spreading, over-the-hill film "personality" who possesses only a gargantuan Hollywood house and a neurotic, pseudo-lesbian daughter. Joe thinks he'll do anything for his "art," his dream of stardom once again on TV or anew in the flickers. In fact, the character Joe is nothing *but* his bod and his tool, not a man but a male thing. *Heat* is not merely another X-rated sexploitation waste, but a truly funny and truly sad commentary both on sex-starved women and, more importantly, on the male gender as sex objects— a reversal of the usual

"SPIGOTRY *has reached the college curriculum, you should know. Boise State College scheduled a seminar on 'grantsmanship' this month, 'designed for any person, agency, organization, city or county interested in getting through the red tape' and into the trough. No seminars for taxpayers have been scheduled."*

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The Bootblack Stand

Dr. George Washington Plunkitt, our prize-winning political analyst, is celebrating the publication of his new book, which is now available at *avant-garde* bookstores throughout New Jersey. Dr. Plunkitt's book is about the importance of altruism in politics and it is titled *What's in It for Me?* Although Dr. Plunkitt expects to earn ten million dollars from sales of his new book, he has agreed to continue to advise public figures through this column. Address all correspondence to "The Bootblack Stand" c/o The Establishment, R.R. 11, Box 360, Bloomington, Indiana 47401, Continental U.S.A.

Dear Mr. Plunkitt:

My wife will not let me play in the tub with my rubber duck anymore. She says that the newspapers might find out and make me to look like a saphead. I have told her that I will not take a bath without it. And besides I am so active in the ecology movement it seems to me that I could tell the press that I was only trying to study the way ducks swim in oil slicks. What do you think?

Troubled,
Mike Gravel, U.S. Senator

Dear Senator Gravel:

I think you are a real sport. Ever since your Thespian display at the Democratic Convention you have been one of my favorites. You are possibly the first geek ever to be elected to the United States Senate. I'll have to think about your problem for a while though, for I had no idea you ever bathed. Why not just use a heavier cologne?

— GWP

Dear Mr. Plunkitt:

Well the 92nd Congress closed up shop the other day and all of those no goods skedaddled to their home districts to butter up the voters and insure themselves a piece of the action for the next few years or so, and I am left here trying to clean up after them. There are old bottles stuffed in every little cranny of the Capitol and all of them empty! Trash is all around. In the House there are mountains of spit balls around the Speaker's chair. Several of the old boys carved their initials into their desks, and one left an obscene suggestion. Peculiar literature litters the halls, odd stuff like a manual on how to grow hair, and one of Iowa's senators left booklets around about conversations with the dead — blasphemy I call it. Frankly they were the oddest lot that has come to Washington in the forty years that I have served on the maintenance staff. I would not allow my little granddaughter around the building while they were in session. In fact I wouldn't want the family cat around the place. The best of them was indicted and convicted for bribery. The worst were too awful to describe. I expect the reason their constituents send them to Washington is to get them out of their neighborhoods. One of them, a sassy gal with floppy hats and a mustache, used the vilest language I have heard since the days they used to hold cock fights out in Virginia during Prohibition. Now what I want to know is why folks like me have to put up with it? I'd sooner kiss a pig then clean up after their messings again.

Respectfully,
Opel Johnny Morton
Capitol Maintenance Staff

Dear Mr. Morton:

For shame! You speak of the chosen representatives of the American people. Men who have amassed vast fortunes and who wield enormous power; the power of the sovereign people of this glorious Republic. The congressman who allegedly accepted that bribe did it in the grandest tradition of American politics, and the Iowa Solon who talks to the dead is a genuine reformer. I expect his intentions are to extend the benefits of democracy even to the deceased, as is the custom in certain wards of progressive Chicago. The "sassy gal" of whom you write is probably but speaking in the authentic idiom of her people. Her language might soon be studied in many of the great universities and analyzed in the *Modern Language Association* (M.L.A.). My good man you neither understand the greatness of the American political tradition nor the fresh winds of change sweeping across the land, bringing forth the New Age. You are out of step with the times. I suggest you retire now before a quota is applied to your establishment and you are retired by the forces of justice and compassion.

— GWP

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movie roles and a brightly successful one at that. It is in spots amateurish, and "dirty," yes, but not gratuitously so. I've no idea whether Paul Morrissey sees himself as an American moralist a la Eric Rohmer (of the Six Moral Tales), but especially in *Trash* and now in *Heat*, he is carving out an important niche for himself as flayer of the American sex dream.

In Deliverance, John Boorman gives us a film I'm quite sure will remain for many years a paradigm of the filmic art; in *Heat*, Paul Morrissey points to a coming career, his own, of considerable note. And both films present performances worthy of more than passing praise: Jon Voight, who may be what many of us thought Dustin Hoffman or Jack Nicholson would become, the finest younger male actor of the decade; Joe Dallesandro, lesser, certainly, than Voight, but a maturing actor deserving praise; and Sylvia Myles, who should have and could have made Sophie come alive in *Portnoy's Complaint* had she been given the role, and who will, in time, if offered more parts as meaty as hers in *Heat*, be recognized as perhaps the most stunning product of Warhol's haphazard process of discovery.

David Brudnoy

CONTINUING CRISIS

(continued from page 2)

● The New Conservatism threatens the progressive democracy of New Guinea where Assemblyman Onamauta Beibe declared in the august Papua House of Assembly that "I have not eaten human flesh for a long time, and I am quite satisfied." On the scientific front, the *Boston Globe* reports that Dr. Frits Wendt believes the Earth can produce enough food to feed fifty times its present population; shortly thereafter Moroccoan medical authorities corroborated Dr. Wendt's testimony by declaring that some of their countrymen eat as much as six pounds of dirt a day, "not just because they are hungry, but because they think it does them good." In Texas acupuncture was banned by the Texas Board of Chiropractic Examiners, and in Belfast Purdysburn Hospital's Dr. H.A. Lyons believes that Northern Ireland's street rioting is good for citizens who are otherwise suicide prone.

● On October 28 Oakland won the World Series, while in Kuala Lampur one hundred farmers lost a tug-of-war to an elephant. Also from that same prospering metropolis comes word that Malaysian authorities will not allow conjugal relations in jails.

● One week after Norway voted against entering the Common Market, Denmark opted for entrance despite the realpolitik of Mr. Olaf Piertson. Mr. Piertson set himself afire in protest of the recent loss of his job and the possible entrance of his country into the European scheme. The Canadian Broadcasting Company stepped beyond bilingualism by issuing its first new release in Eskimo; at the end of the month the Canadian voters turned thumbs down on Prime Minister Trudeau's party by giving the Tories a one vote majority.

● The Senate approved the appointment of General Creighton Abrams as Army Chief of Staff, and the Senate Armed Services Committee closed its investigation into the private war of General Lavelle, ret.. In England the Education Ministry has warned that British schoolchildren may be breeding lice in their long hair, while back in modern Kuala Lampur the government has banned "hippies." The one-horned rhinoceros is making a comeback on the Indian subcontinent and reports from New Delhi indicate that the great Indian Bustard will soon be getting government aid. But shocking news has reached us from the Connecticut Audibon Society which is demanding the extermination of the monk parakeet! In Ann Arbor, that

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professor suspended for showing anti-war slides in his organic chemistry class is back on the job as is Miss Susan Foust, the 309 pound topless dancer from Portland, Oregon, who met with tragedy when she tried to perform on a table top. The 54-46-59 hoofer now restricts her performances to the stage.

● Suliemen, the oldest Arab in captivity, died at his home on the Gaza Strip at the age of 104, Leo J. Carrol went on to glory at the age of 85, and at the end of the month Ezra Pound fell ill. An-An, the amorous Russian panda, passed away in a Moscow zoo, and Spaghetti will be buried in Laurinburg, North Carolina. Spaghetti is the Italian immigrant who died in 1911 and has been on display at the McDoughal Funeral Home in progressive Laurinburg for 61 years. At the behest of Congressmen Biaggi of New York and Broyhill of North Carolina and the State Attorney General of North Carolina, the local citizens agreed Spaghetti would receive a Christian burial. The trial of the Watergate Seven will begin on November 15, thirty-nine days before Christmas. In Kuala Lampur, Mr. Singa Lamb accused a farmer's cow of stealing his motor bike, and though Mr. Kissinger sent hopes soaring at the end of the month with claims that peace was just around the corner — the fighting continued. The Defense Department had announced earlier that the 1972 bomb tonnage had already topped last year's.

● The Women's Heroic Crusade continued as two Maryland women sued to vote under their maiden names. The women's claims were upheld by the Maryland Court of Appeals, but Ms. Bertha Bentendorf's cause is still in doubt. Ms. Bentendorf of the National Organization for Women sued when New York refused to grant her a license to marry her three-year-old pet chihuahua. But in Kuala Lampur police have warned that women who wear backless dresses or blouses without brassieres will be arrested, and in Bangkok things are worse. Still the worst news, as expected, comes from Washington where the FCC rejected the claims of Ms. Fran Lee of an anti-dog group, "Children Before Dogs," refusing to allow her equal time to protest the "pro-dog" views of NBC. In a statement interlarded with sophistries, the FCC claimed Ms. Lee had "failed to demonstrate that dog food poses a danger to human health." That is the way it goes in America — in the words of Hinky Dink Kena, "Ya pays your money and ya takes your chances."

ROSENBLATT

(continued from page 4)

caricature intentionally, and therefore authentic.

It would not be fair to consider Shakespeare's or Marlowe's kings in the same vein, because we have no modern Shakespeare or Marlowe to test the comparison. Still, it is an interesting speculation to wonder why the sixteenth and seventeenth-century English public could avidly seek out or at least accept, the complexities in their Heads of State, while we children of the democratic enlightenment seek out the stereotype. It is not enough, or accurate, to point to the general disintegration of the dramatic hero, and say that the nobility and grandeur of kings would look foolish on our presidents, for it is not nobility our presidents, theatrical and otherwise, lack, but character. Indeed, if anything, our presidents are larger and more potent than Renaissance kings. They are so grand, in fact, that they are beyond personality.

Yet the losers in this game of delusions are always ourselves. It is we who look at the men paraded on stilts and ropes before us every four years, each supposedly speaking directly to us, to our mortgages, our health plans, our desires for equal rights, for education, for peace, our poverty and old age, our draft status, our safety,—and feel no kinship. Who are these enormous people? What are they that seek our votes and allegiance? They are the products of our wildest dreams. Images of images raised to a power beyond our recognition. We do not recognize them, and they, in recompense, do not recognize us, because in the process of exaggeration, we too have been turned into caricatures. We, the People.

Critics have a habit of referring to presidential campaigns as circuses or side shows, but the reference is inadequate. Presidential campaigns are full-fledged satires. They use the elements of satire, and effect the end of satire as well, which is a diminishing of the importance of the subject at hand. In the presidential satires, the importance of the candidates is diminished from our perspective, and our importance is diminished from theirs. In many ways we are the more diminished, because we have created the context of our own ridicule.

The election is completed, and the people's choice once again takes his position in the elegant Georgian building we have set aside for him. Party workers return to their places behind the scenes, television returns to its regular programming, and we mount our seats at the breakfast tables, ready to mutter into the headlines. The losing candidate reels off into his special oblivion, perhaps to give it one more go, if he can come up with the right image. The winner, engulfed in this year's right image, now towers above us like Caesar, who, said Cassius, bestrode the narrow world like a colossus. He believes he has the will of the people, and in a way he has. Hail, Caesar. Hail, and farewell.

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
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"Whom the gods destroy they first make mad"– Euripides

Current Wisdom

STRAIGHT SKINNY

The illustrious New Republic digs up another disturbing bit of information on Washington in The Age of Nixon:

White House aide Charles Colson, whom speculation has linked to the Watergate affair, was a captain in the Marines.

— The New Republic

UNCOMMON WISDOM

Hardheaded Political Analysis by Sydney J. Harris, a savant and dabbler in make-believe:

If there were some way we could examine the private lives of public men — with a sort of psychic X-ray — I think we would discover that the loving faculty in them had been dammed up and diverted into channels that ran toward power and position and conquest.

— The Chicago Daily News

SUGGESTED READING

That same awesome intellect takes time out to suggest an elegant perusal into Belles Lettres.

Between junkets to old folks' homes and schools for the blind, Mrs. Nixon should read *The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia*. This is a shocking book.

— The New York Post

SHOW BIZ

Norma Lee Browning goes to great lengths to capture a moment which will live in history:

HEARTBREAK TIME: It's touch and go whether dancer Ann Miller will be able to open in "Anything Goes" in Toledo, Ohio. We talked to Annie by phone at Deaconess Hospital in St. Louis, where she was injured on opening night about midway thru her performance to a packed house — 12,000 persons — at the Municipal Opera. "I've got a helluva flap on the head, and I guess my brains are all addled," she said in a typical Ann Millerism, for which she is famous.

— The Chicago Tribune

POLITICAL PRISONERS

Another political prisoner, Mrs. Clifford Irving, spouse of the modern Boswell, delivers a touching exordium before being clapped into a Swiss Calaboose!

I came here of my free will and I trust that I shall soon be a free person again, with a passport and able to travel to see my family and everybody.

— Mrs. Clifford Irving

A PHILOSOPHY OF POLITICS

George McGovern, U.S. Senator and Doctor of Philosophy, exhibits his abundant knowledge of political philosophy:

I just deny this left and right and center nonsense. I haven't had one single voter since I've been campaigning in fifteen months, come up to me and say, I'm against you because you are not a centrist. I don't even know what that means myself, how could I explain that to anyone else? I don't know what left and right are. Is it left to be against this stupid war. Is it right-wing to be against pollution?

— George McGovern
CBS News
April 26, 1972

RELIGIOUS AWAKENING

Harriet Van Horne speaks the wisdom of the half-aware:

To anyone even half aware of the repression, the corruption, the total depravity of the Thieu-Ky government, this pledge of allegiance from Mrs. Nixon and her daughter can only be regarded as political blasphemy.

— The New York Post

THE SEX OF POLITICS

World history as viewed through the puffy eyes of Sydney J. Harris, columnist and sexual psychopath:

Since political power goes to those who crave it and combat for it, and since those who crave it (in my opinion) are enjoying it as a substitute for the erotic pleasure they cannot achieve, it is hardly surprising that most leaders have plunged their nations into bloodbaths with dismaying regularity throughout the centuries.

— The Chicago Daily News

THAT McGOVERN MAGIC

During the New Democrats' Crusade for the New Age, an ex-professor of history speaks:

The Nixon administration is the most morally bankrupt administration in the entire history of our country.

— Senator George McGovern

HURRICANE HUBERT

CBS records the fortissimo sound of Senator Humphrey gusting through the spring primaries:

We don't need a rich America, we need a decent America. We need a just America. We need a humane America. And we need an America that's proud. With all of its citizens, all of its citizens having a great joy in saying: I'm a citizen of the United States, that's the only title I need. I can go anywhere in the world, anywhere in this country, because I'm a citizen of the United States. Give me your hand friends, and give me your help. Go on out and help me win this election, and there will be a new day in America for every American, I guarantee to you.

— Hubert Humphrey
CBS News
April 21, 1972

STOMACH DISORDERS

Columnist Carl T. Rowan displays that incomparable logic which compensates for his apparent lack of formal education and has made him a sought-after commentator and oracle:

All this babble about quotas reminds me of the comment of the big-corral guru of the GOP, John Wayne. "I believe in white supremacy until blacks are educated to the point of responsibility," he said. "I don't believe in giving authority and positions of leadership and judgment to irresponsible people."

Some of the people deploring "quotas" these days would retch at being compared with Wayne, but their argument is about the same. If you see that blacks are so bad off, and you refuse to admit that they are being discriminated against, you have to believe that they are bad off because they are inferior.

There is no black escape from that imprisoning white judgment.

— The Chicago Daily News

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GOW

(continued from page 6)

that the value of science is not a scientific fact, and that he, too, makes use of the values of logic and epistemology.

Like positivism, behaviorism has done much to undermine the philosophical and religious roots of freedom, roots which we who believe that man has dignity and more than just instrumental value must conserve and defend. Sam Adams was correct when he said that "the truth is, all might be free if they valued freedom, and defended it as they ought." We ought not to remain complacent as the scientific *hubris* which manifests itself in such pernicious movements as positivism and behaviorism rejects the "divine spark" within man.

The behaviorist contends that there are no activities (e.g., the utilization of our rationality) and that there is no such thing as principled behavior (i.e., behavior that is influenced by consciously entertained generalizations), since man's behavior, he further asserts, results from processes outside of his control.

However, what occurs when the behaviorist is challenged to prove his assertions? Does he not, in fact, engage in activities, in principled behavior? The obvious answer is: Yes, for if the behaviorist is to validate his point of view, he must search for evidence, appeal to the norms of inquiry, consult the principles of logic. By engaging in these activities the behaviorist—by his own behavior—refutes his own elaborate theories. We have to remember that for any theory to have a chance to validate its truth-claims, it must allow for a defense; this the behaviorist does not sufficiently take into account. Perhaps C. D. Broad was not unduly harsh when he said that behaviorism is "so preposterously silly that only the very learned men could have thought of (it)."

We come, finally, to the acquired freedom of self-perfection. This notion of freedom makes it possible for one to be living in a concentration camp or jail and still be considered a "free man," as long as he is virtuous. Saint Paul, for example, was warned that if he continued preaching he would be sent to prison. But Paul, unwilling to compromise his moral principles even at the expense of his own life, continued his efforts to propagandize Christianity. As a result, he had to accept the loathsome consequences. Although it is impossible to claim that he was free in Hobbes' sense, Paul, according to proponents of the third meaning of freedom, was indeed a free man.

It is important to note, however, that holding to one meaning of freedom does not proclude one from holding to other senses as well. In fact, it is my view that Adler's three senses of freedom are vitally interrelated. The absence of external impediments facilitates the implementation of courses of action freely decided upon by the individual. And unless the individual possesses the inherent power to choose among alternatives, he cannot become truly virtuous, for the meaning of virtue resides in the free choice of good over evil.

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